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Due Diligence and Investee Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
  
 
 
 
 Our study provides new evidence on due diligence (DD) and its impact on investee performance. 
We estimate the economic value of due diligence (DD) in the context of private equity (PE) by 
investigating the relationship between DD and investee performance, while controlling for endogeneity. 
With the adoption of a novel and unique dataset, we find evidence highly consistent with the view that a 
thorough DD is associated with improved future investee performance.  We also distinguish the role of 
different types of DD and show that the DD carried out internally by fund managers has a more 
pronounced impact on performance. Instead, the DD mainly performed by external agents, such as 
consultants, lawyers and accountants, gives rise to puzzling results and imperfect matching, highlighting 
the existence of apparent agency problems.  
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“What we hope ever to do with ease, we must learn first to do with diligence.”  
 Samuel Johnson (Boswell, 2010. Life of Johnson, Volume 1, 1709-1765)  
 
1. Introduction  
This study aims at empirically investigating the determinants and economic value of due 
diligence (DD) in the context of private equity (PE) financing, as well as the impact of different 
types of DD (e.g., internal vs. external) on firm performance. Despite the emphasis placed on the 
importance of DD by various industry guides and venture capital associations (e.g., the European 
Venture Capital Association, the National Venture Capital Association, and the Canadian Venture 
Capital Association), very few academic studies have investigated its efficacy and economic 
value. For the purpose of this paper, we adopt the term “private equity” to refer to the later stage 
financing of existing firms, in line with the definition provided by the Italian Venture Capital 
Association (AIFI), Capizzi (2004), and Heed (2010), among others. This definition, which 
differs from the one typically adopted in USA (see, e.g., Korteweg and Sorensen, 2014), excludes 
the funding of start-up and early stage firms (venture capital investments) and includes:  a) 
development or expansion financing b) leveraged buyout (LBO) deals, and c) replacement and 
turnaround financing (see, e.g., Zambelli, 2010; 2014). Historically, the PE sector has dominated 
the Italian alternative financing industry, while early stage investments have always represented a 
minority (see AIFI Statistics Reports from 1999 onwards, Caselli et al., 2013). 
Research in entrepreneurial finance has stressed the importance of due diligence, but 
primarily from a theoretical perspective (Yung, 2009). While empirical studies to date have 
emphasized the importance of investor characteristics, reputation, and cultural differences among 
venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) intermediaries (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; 
Caselli et al., 2013; Das et al., 2010; Masulis and Nahata, 2009, Nahata, 2008; Nahata et al., 
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2013; Sevilir, 2010), no empirical studies have formally examined the economic value and impact 
of DD. Related research in corporate finance (Li and Prabhala, 2006) and entrepreneurial finance 
(Sorensen, 2007; Yung, 2009; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2012) has focused on selection models. 
However, there have been no empirical studies examining the financial importance of selection 
and matching investors and investees in a PE setting. Also, little evidence exists on how such 
screening takes place and who exactly carries out due diligence. In this paper, we provide some 
of the first evidence on screening by empirically investigating the determinants and the economic 
value of the due diligence in the context of private equity (PE) financing. Moreover, we provide a 
novel look at the impact of different types of due diligence (e.g., internal vs. external) on firm 
performance. We compare the role of lawyers, accountants, and consultants carrying out due 
diligence to assess whether there are agency costs associated with delegating due diligence. 
As highlighted by Brown et al. (2008, 2009, 2012), due diligence is crucial for hedge fund 
and other types of alternative investments, including but not limited to PE financing. Likewise, 
we would expect that due diligence is particularly important in PE financing where value-added 
fund managers are actively involved in the governance and management of their portfolio 
companies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Casamatta, 2003; Inderst 
and Muller, 2004; Yung, 2009; Ivanov and Xie, 2010). Also, private equity funds are generally 
not well diversified and, as such, fund managers take extra care to mitigate idiosyncratic risks 
(Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004; Nahata, 2008; Nielsen, 2008; Knill, 2009; Wang and 
Wang, 2011, 2012; Altintig et al., 2013; Nahata et al., 2013). 
In the context of our analysis, due diligence refers to the investigation process of a 
prospective investment in a particular target firm by PE investors (hereafter venture capitalists, or 
VCs). Due diligence involves a thorough assessment of a number of factors, e.g., management 
skills, target industry and competitors, project opportunity, financial forecasts, and strategic fit 
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with the fund portfolio companies (Camp, 2002), as well as operational and financial risk (Brown 
et al. 2008). This evaluation process may be performed mainly internally by PE fund managers 
themselves (“internal DD”) or mainly externally by strategic and financial consultants, or law and 
accountancy firms (“external DD”). For the purpose of this study, when we use the terms 
“internal” or “external” due diligence we refer to the agents (internal or external) who performed  
the majority of the due diligence process (not the entire process). These activities are not 
mutually exclusive and may act as complements. For example, an “internal” DD refers to a 
situation in which the majority of the DD is performed by the PE investor internally and it is 
possible that a small part of this activity (e.g., the legal DD) is delegated externally (see Table 1 
for more details on the definitions of the different  types of DD adopted in our study).  
A rigorous due diligence is costly and takes time. Expenses for due diligence include 
direct costs of paying for information pertaining to the investee, legal costs for background 
checks, and the value of time spent on the due diligence. Indirect costs of due diligence include 
the potential lost opportunity in terms of the investee walking away from the deal or getting 
financing elsewhere. Indirect costs likewise include opportunity costs on time not spent 
considering other potential projects, or time not spent on adding value to other firms in a fund’s 
portfolio. Considering the costs, time and effort involved, important research questions are: a) 
How worth is the time spent on implementing it?; b) Would it be better to save time and delegate 
this investigation process to external agents (e.g., strategic consultants, law firms, or 
accountants)? As highlighted by Camp (2002), the main reason underlying such deep 
investigation of prospective investments in target companies is that, by doing so, VCs hope to 
make better investment decisions, and thereby enhance the returns on their overall portfolios. 
However, considering the direct and indirect costs involved, PE investors may be tempted to  rush 
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the DD process or to delegate it to external agents and  it is not exactly clear as to whether or not 
additional due diligence is worth it in terms of performance payoffs.  
Despite the existence of a vast literature on selection criteria (for a recent review see, e.g., 
Alemany and Villanueva, 2014), no prior study has empirically investigated the economic value 
of DD and its efficacy with reference to how much the investment in due diligence pays in terms 
of obtaining better future performance from the investee. The importance and the costs of due 
diligence for PE funds have been examined solely from a theoretical perspective by Yung (2009), 
who argues that due diligence facilitates matching and mitigates adverse selection problems. To 
the best of our knowledge no prior study has empirically examined the relationship between PE 
due diligence and investment performance. Partial exceptions are Wangerin (2015), who analyzes 
the DD in the context of M&A transactions, Brown et al. (2008), who investigated the role of due 
diligence solely for hedge funds, Sorensen (2007), who estimates the impact of sorting and 
matching in the context of investments made in early stage and startup companies, and Baum and 
Silverman (2004), who examined the screening role of VC funds by focusing only on the 
biotechnology industry and start-up firms. These studies highlight the need for further and 
broader research on the selection process in PE  settings.   
 In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap by empirically assessing the efficacy and 
time-value of DD through the adoption of a novel and unique hand-collected dataset, which 
covers the majority of the funds actively involved in the Italian PE market, whose transactions 
experienced relevant legal changes that affected their frequency and the allocation of attention of 
PE funds.1 More specifically, we investigate the economic value of an additional week of DD, 
and account for the role played by the particular agent performing such DD (i.e., PE fund 
                                                 
1
 See Heed (2010) and Nahata et al.  (2013) for related studies investigating the impact of the legal environment in 
PE finance; see Zambelli (2010) for details regarding the changes experienced by the PE legal setting in Italy. 
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managers, external legal advisors, chartered accountants, or other external consultants). Sorensen 
(2007) provides a matching model without any empirical analysis of factors pertinent to internal versus 
external due diligence or the extent of internal versus external due diligence. Our study is the first to 
empirically evaluate this aspect.  
In terms of outcomes, the key  performance measures underlying our study are related to 
investee firms. In line with Richard et al. (2009) and Kabir and Roosenboom (2003), for each 
investee firm we track two operating performance indicators over the first three years from the 
investment date: the Return on Assets (ROA) and the operating profit margin (EBITDA to Sales 
ratio, hereafter EBITDA/Sales), as measures of operating profitability. These performance 
measures on a firm level are also consistent with Caselli et al. (2013), and Cao (2013).2 The key 
independent variable underlying our study is represented by the time spent on due diligence, 
considered as a proxy of the importance and effort given by the investor to that particular activity, 
in line with a recent tendency in the entrepreneurial field (e.g., Wangerin 2015; Achleitner et al., 
2014).3 
                                                 
2
 It is worth noting that other performance measures on a fund level could be considered (IRR and IPO exit).  
However, we decided to focus on ROA and EBITDA/SALES because we want to measure 3-year performance from 
date of investment to have a uniform measure of performance that can be reasonably connected to due diligence.  
IRRs are difficult to use, as many firms will not have had an exit within 3 years, and hence IRRs are based on 
imprecise valuations which are often wrong (Cumming and Walz, 2010).  And because we look at a 3 years horizon 
where many firms do not yet have an exit, we cannot examine IPOs. Moreover, as highlighted in Caselli et al. 
(2013), ROA and EBITDA/SALES do not heavily depend on market conditions as IRR does (which is influenced by 
the entry and exit prices paid by the PE fund). The IPO exit is also a coarse measure of an investment outcome (i.e., 
ROA and EBIT/Sales can vary widely across different IPOs), despite his wide usage, as highlighted by Sorensen 
(2007). Nevertheless, for robustness purposes in Section 6.4. we do show results on the impact of DD on IPOs, and 
the findings are consistent. 
3
   We decided to use the time spent on DD as a proxy of the importance given by investors to the DD activity and 
their effort in implementing such activity. The intuition behind this decision is that the time dedicated to a certain 
activity can capture the role and importance that this activity plays for a particular agent. This is especially true for 
the PE industry where the opportunity cost of time is enormous and PE investors may be tempted to rush the due 
diligence activity of perspective investments in order to allocate more attention to managing and adding value to 
existing portfolio firms. By looking at the high variability in the time spent on DD among different PE investors and 
within the same PE fund, we imply that such difference can effectively capture a different level of effort, which 
differs on a case-by-case basis. The more time and attention a fund manager allocates to the due diligence of a certain 
firm, more resources the fund is allocating to that firm, and this captures the underlying importance given by such 
investor to the activity of due diligence. This is also in line with a recent evidence  in the entrepreneurial finance field 
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Our empirical analyses consistently highlight the efficacy and importance of due diligence 
in improving firm performance (especially if the due diligence activity is carried out by internal 
fund managers). Our results are highly consistent with the view that the time spent on due 
diligence has substantial economic value, and reinforces the implications underlying the 
theoretical model of Yung (2009), and the evidence provided by Brown et al. (2008; 2012). 
Overall, an extra week of due diligence is statistically associated with higher levels of ROA and 
EBITDA/Sales over a three-year period after the investment date, even after controlling for 
endogeneity and other things being equal. PE funds on average carry out seven weeks of due 
diligence, and our estimates suggest that the effect of an extra four weeks of due diligence is on 
average associated with a doubling of three-year ROA performance. 
Our data also allow us to distinguish the role played by different agents implementing the 
majority of due diligence. Our findings show that, when the majority of the due diligence is 
performed internally by PE investment managers, a more pronounced role on firm performance 
emerges. Surprisingly, when the majority of the due diligence is carried out externally by law 
firms, accounting firms, and external strategic management consultants there is no significant 
impact on target firm performance. This result suggests the existence of apparent agency costs 
associated with external due diligence and emphasizes the need for more theoretical and 
empirical research in this field. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it 
helps advance the knowledge on the role and importance of due diligence. Second, it sheds some 
light on the economic value of the time spent on due diligence, in terms of future performance of 
investee firms. Third, it shows a greater efficacy of the due diligence implemented by PE fund 
manager, highlighting the existence of agency costs associated to the delegation of such activity 
                                                                                                                                                              
(see, e.g., Wangerin 2015, Achleitner et al., 2014) where the time spent in implementing or discussing a certain 
activity is considered a proxy of the importance of such activity. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the institutional setting.  Section 4 describes the employed 
research methodology and the dataset, as well as provides representative tests and summary 
statistics. Sections 5 and 6 present the univariate and multivariate tests, respectively. The last 
section provides concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses  
 Our paper is related to three main streams of literature. The first stream pertains to the 
literature directly related to due diligence in terms of the value of screening. The second stream 
pertains to matching models. The third pertains to the private equity literature in terms of the 
drivers of performance. In this section we briefly discuss each in turn. 
 Our paper is most closely related to Yung’s (2009) theoretical model of the tradeoffs 
associated with undertaking costly due diligence. One of the main reasons underlying the 
existence of private equity funds is that banks and other financial intermediaries offering more 
traditional sources of capital are unable to perform, in a cost effective manner, the screening 
required to undertake due diligence and monitor an investee that exhibits significant adverse 
selection costs (Yung, 2009). Adverse selection costs of attracting excessively risky companies 
are particularly pronounced for banks and other loan sources of capital (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
As a result, private equity funds that are able to mitigate adverse selection by undertaking costly 
due diligence are in a better position to finance such investee companies. Moreover, the investee 
companies that are able to incur costly signals of quality are more likely to obtain funding. Costly 
due diligence is typically more effective than costly signals of quality incurred by target 
companies because the latter are cash constrained while investors are in a better position to incur 
costs of due diligence (Yung, 2009). 
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 How entrepreneurial firms and private equity funds form matches has been the subject of 
recent scholarly research (Bengtsson and Hsu, 2012). Matching models more generally are useful 
in this regard because they enable evaluation of selection effects distinguished from other effects 
such as value-added. Sorenson (2007) uses general matching models to empirically study the 
importance of matching and finds that matching is roughly twice as important as private equity 
experience, in terms of explaining IPO exit outcomes (see Li et al., 2006 for a survey of these 
models). Empirical studies in venture capital and private equity have examined both screening 
and the drivers of returns. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) study screening in terms of factors 
considered in due diligence and provide examples of what led an investor to invest in the context 
of venture capital deals. Drivers of returns are studied in numerous papers, such as Nahata 
(2008), Cao and Lerner (2009), and Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010).  
Our context is quite different, since we study private equity deals and measure the extent 
of due diligence and who exactly carried out the due diligence (internally, or externally by an 
accounting firm, law firm, or consulting firm).  Prior work has not studied the link between the 
duration of due diligence effort and PE investee performance. Prior work in the context hedge 
funds shows that due diligence is a source of alpha (Brown et al., 2008; 2009; 2012).  Brown et 
al., however, do not consider the extent of due diligence effort in terms of the time, but rather 
examine materials related to registration statements. Our paper is different insofar as we measure 
screening by the extent of due diligence, and relate this due diligence to performance measures 
pertinent to the entrepreneurial firm, including ROA and EBITDA/Sales. Guided from the results 
of Brown et al. (2008; 2012), we expect a positive relation between firm performance and due 
diligence due to the improved decision making over whether to invest, and a better matching 
between investor and entrepreneur.  
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H1:  There is a positive but diminishing relation between weeks spent on due diligence and 
investee performance due to improved screening and matching. 
Also, we consider differences in this relationship for different parties that carry out due 
diligence. Guided from the implications underlying Yung’s (2009) theoretical model, we expect 
that internal due diligence is more effective than external due diligence for the purpose of the 
matching function between entrepreneurs and their investors. The intuition is that external due 
diligence service providers such as accounting firms, law firms and consulting firms face 
information asymmetries associated with the skills of the private equity fund and its fund 
managers, thereby leading to imperfect knowledge in matching with entrepreneurial teams. By 
contrast, private equity fund managers face no information asymmetries about themselves, and 
only face the same information asymmetries that external service providers face vis-à-vis the 
entrepreneurial team. If the ability of the internal management team is the same as the ability of 
the external consultants in mitigating the information asymmetries with the entrepreneurial team, 
then the private equity fund managers will be more effective at finding a more suitable match 
than the external consultants. 
H2. When due diligence is primarily done internally (as opposed to primarily done externally 
by a law firm, accounting firm, or consulting firm), there is a stronger link between due 
diligence and performance due to the improved matching of the investor and the 
entrepreneur. 
 In respect of H2, we note that different external service providers (accounting firms, law 
firms, and consulting firms) may have different abilities in terms of mitigating information 
asymmetries vis-à-vis the entrepreneurial firms. If so, we would expect different results 
depending on who carries out the due diligence. We do not conjecture who is most effective in 
advance of presenting the data, but we do carry out such tests in the analysis of the data. 
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These above hypotheses are tested for the first time in the subsequent sections. Our tests 
are based on unique and detailed data that are described below in section 4.  The data are based 
on the Italian private equity industry, and as such in section 3 we first describe the institutional 
context from which the data are derived. 
 
3. Institutional Context Affecting the Italian PE Industry 
 Buyout transactions in Italy experienced a period of uncertain legitimacy and illegality 
and only recently did they become outright legal (with the issuance of the new corporate 
governance law, Legislative Decree 6/2003, applicable as of January 1, 2004; for details see 
Zambelli, 2010).  
Over the ‘90s, the legitimacy of leveraged buyouts were severely criticized and highly 
debated, because LBOs were accused of involving a lack of full disclosure and contributing to the 
weakening of the target firms. Leveraged buyout transactions even received an illegality 
declaration by the Italian Supreme Court which prohibited these types of transactions reinforcing 
the decisions of illegality made by various lower courts in prior years (see the Supreme Court 
Decision 5503/2000). In October 2001, the Italian Parliament issued a new Bill of Law (Law 
366/2001) announcing its intention of reconsidering the buyout legal framework and create a 
safer harbor for such types of transactions (Article 7d). This Bill of Law 366/2001 was not 
immediately applicable in Italy as it was solely an enabling act with which the Government 
received the power of legalizing leveraged buyouts under specific guidelines. Even though this 
Bill of Law provided investors with some hope for a more favorable LBO legal harbor, there was 
no certainty regarding dates and outcomes of the new buyout reform. Moreover, in 2002, a new 
criminal law reform (Legislative Decree 61/2002) became effective introducing new prosecutions 
applicable to LBOs in the case of bankruptcy of the target firms. In January 1, 2004, a new law 
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came into force and leveraged buyouts were legalized under a set of conditions, especially with 
reference to disclosure (see the article 2501 bis, of the Legislative Decree 6/2003, applicable as of 
January 1, 2004). Contrary to what occurred in previous years, the new LBO reform reversed the 
burden of proof: LBOs are now considered legal until proven otherwise (see Zambelli, 2010 for 
more details). For the investment period spanning 1999–2006, it is possible to identify three 
different sub-periods, associated with a number of changes in legal settings experienced by the 
Italian PE industry. As shown in Cumming and Zambelli (2010), these legal changes significantly 
affected the frequency and the governance structure of PE transactions in Italy and, as such, it is 
plausible to expect that they may also affect the DD time and the type of DD performed by PE 
funds. 
In order to account for these legal changes we have created three different dummy 
variables that are metaphorically labeled: “Dark period”, “Hope period”, and “Sun period” (as in 
Cumming and Zambelli 2010, 2013). In our data, the “Dark period” identifies the period of 
illegality and represents the time span from January 1999 to September 2001 over which the 
legitimacy of leveraged buyouts was highly disputed and LBOs were deemed illegal by the 
Italian Supreme Court (for a detailed discussion on the reasons and case law underlying the 
illegality of LBOs in Italy, see Zambelli, 2010). The subsequent period, characterized by 
Parliament’s announcement of rendering LBOs legal, is instead labeled the “Hope period”, and it 
covers the October 2001–December 2003 time horizon. The period subsequent to January 2004 
(and ending July 2006 in our data) identifies the time horizon over which LBOs became legal. 
This particular period is labeled the “Sun period” (or period of legality) and represents the period 
over which the legitimacy of LBO was ultimately clarified. 
The different institutional settings provide useful instruments for our empirical analyses 
below. We expect a weaker DD  over the Dark period, since PE funds in that period are aimed at 
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minimizing the risk of a legal dispute with the target firm that could end up with an illegality 
declaration. The threat of a legal dispute at that time may distort the investors’ incentives to 
implement a thorough DD. Over the dark period, PE investors have obvious legal incentives to 
not invest in hostile targets (as shown in Cumming and Zambelli 2010).  Cumming and Zambelli 
(2010) show the perils of a restrictive regulation. They show how the periods of illegality and 
uncertain legality in Italy have increased the incentives for PE investors to implement  a distorted 
due diligence of target firms, because PE investors seem to be more motivated to screen firms 
according to the  level of agreeableness with their target management and minority shareholders 
in the hopes of reducing the risk of a subsequent  legal dispute that could turn into an illegality 
declaration of the entire acquisition process. 
 
4. Data 
One of the major problems faced by scholars in PE financing is the lack of detailed public 
data. Typically, PE organizations and their investee companies are privately held and are not 
required to disclose detailed information on their investments, capital structure, governance, and 
performance. The most commonly used public database on PE financing is Thomson Financial 
Venture Economics, which is not helpful for our research purpose because it includes solely 
standard and basic information on PE deals around the world, e.g., target firms, lead investors, 
syndicated investors, invested and divested amounts, financing rounds, number of investors 
involved, equity stake, investment location. Moreover, for countries outside the U.S. and Canada, 
Thomson Financial Venture Economics only includes a small fraction of the PE deals carried out 
in each year. With reference to the Italian PE market, a few industry datasets exist: a) the AIFI 
Statistics Report, which disclose aggregate information of the private equity and venture capital 
activity in Italy; b) the Venture Capital Monitor (VEM), which reports start-up deals; and c) the 
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Private Equity Monitor (PEM), which reports generic data on the private equity deals. Both VEM 
and PEM datasets are collected by the Italian Venture Capital Association in association with the 
Università Cattaneo di Castellanza. The above industry datasets include generic information on 
the deals carried out in Italy and do not report information on deal structure, due diligence, and 
investee performance. In the absence of high quality publicly available information on due 
diligence and investment outcomes, we hand-collected a unique proprietary dataset gathered from 
a number of primary and secondary sources. 
 Our primary source of information is represented by a three-stage survey of PE 
investments carried out in Italy over the 1999-2006 time horizon and related divestments realized 
from January 2000 to December 2012. For each survey, we followed the methodology discussed 
in Cumming and Zambelli (2010, 2013). Our secondary sources of information are represented by 
various publicly available data on Italian PE deals (e.g., PEM database), performance of private 
firms (e.g., AIDA), market characteristics, fund websites, and economic press release, employed 
to integrate, cross-check and validate the information collected through the survey instrument 
(see the Appendix for detailed information on the secondary sources employed).  
The data underlying this paper provide unique and new information on due diligence and 
investee performance, among other things, that were specifically collected for the purpose of this 
study and not available for use in earlier studies, as described herein. The entire data collection 
procedure, the survey design and the associated response rates are summarized in Figure 1, and 
described in greater detail in the Appendix. 
[include Figure 1] 
 In the Appendix we also provide detailed information pertaining to the representativeness 
of our ultimate dataset by thoroughly discussing different comparison tests. In particular, to 
evaluate the representativeness of our ultimate sample, we compared our dataset with both AIFI 
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Statistics Reports and the Private Equity Monitor (PEM®) database which includes generic 
information on PE deals realized in Italy. We performed a number of comparison tests between 
our sample and the PEM dataset (or AIFI database) with reference to various investee and 
investment characteristics, such as: area and industry distribution of the target firms, yearly 
distribution of PE investments, as well as exit distribution of the divestments occurred within the 
2000-2012 period. Apart from a few exceptions, we did not find significant differences between 
our sample and the AIFI and PEM databases (for more details on the representativeness tests, see 
the Appendix, Table A.1, Panels B–G). The three-stage survey implementation and its validation 
took considerable time and effort but it ultimately allowed us to create a unique dataset 
containing detailed information on PE investment cycle, security design, deal structure,  and 
investment outcomes.  
Our ultimate dataset covers approximately 85% of the buyout investors operating in Italy 
over the 1999-2006 investment period (see the Appendix, Panel A), and comprises in depth 
information on the divestments carried out by PE funds over the 2000-2012 time horizon. Our 
dataset includes 178 investee firms acquired by 27 PE organizations over the period from 1999 to 
2006 (second quarter). Among these 178 PE investments, 150 have been divested within the 
period from January 2000 and December 2012 (for details on the yearly exit distribution over the 
2000-2012 divestment period, see the Appendix, Table 1, Panel E).  
In terms of types of exits employed by PE investors, our data show that the most 
commonly used divestment route is represented by the trade sale (51%), followed by the 
secondary sale (27%), IPO (9%), and buyback by the entrepreneur or founder (4%). This 
evidence is consistent with Caselli et al. (2013). Our sample also includes a portion of write-offs 
(10%), mostly associated with the exits that occurred after the global financial crisis (post August 
2007 – 2009 period). In terms of type of transactions, our database includes 116 (65%) leveraged 
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buyouts and 62 (35%) expansion and replacement financing.4 With reference to investor 
characteristics, our dataset includes the following types of PE funds: 4 (15%) are Italian bank-
subsidiaries, 12 (44%) are Italian independent closed-end funds, 3 (11%) are international bank 
subsidiaries, and the remaining 8 PE firms (30%) are international independent limited partners.  
In Table 1 we describe the dependent and explanatory variables included in our dataset 
and provide related summary statistics. The main dependent variables are represented by firm 
performance indicators (in terms of Return on Assets - ROA - and EBITDA to Sales ratio, as 
defined and motivated in Footnote 2), which are measured in terms of percentage difference over 
the first three years from the investment date. For example, the variable “Return on Assets three-
year difference” represents the percentage difference between the ROA achieved by the target 
firm after three years (ROA 3) from the entrance of the PE investor (investment date) and the 
ROA at the investment date (ROA 0). Similarly, the variable “Return on Assets two-tear 
Difference” represents the percentage difference between the ROA achieved by the firm after two 
years (ROA 2) from the investment date and the ROA at the time of the investment (ROA 0).  
Table 1 provides statistics on due diligence efforts (measured in terms of time spent in 
implementing the due diligence) and type of due diligence (primarily internal or external). PE 
fund managers on average spend 7 weeks on due diligence prior to making a first investment in a 
portfolio firm.  Forty-seven percent of the PE funds in the sample perform the vast majority of the 
due diligence internally.  Sixty-six percent also employ consultants, 68% use lawyers, and 11% 
use accountants in their due diligence efforts.5 
                                                 
4  Our database does not allow to distinguish repeated investments in the same firms.  However, as highlighted by 
Caselli et al. (2013), the standard investment strategy generally adopted  in Italy by PE investors is “one firm – one 
investment”, which implies that  PE funds do not frequently  employ stage financing. 
5
 It is worth noting that these percentages are not mutually exclusive. For example, a PE fund performing the 
majority of DD internally can still delegate some part of DD to external specialized agents. In case of delegation, the 
PE fund can employ different agents (e.g., specialized consultants and/or lawyers and/or accountants). 
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Table 1 also shows a wide set of other control variables aimed at capturing the impact of: 
market conditions (i.e., market returns); investment characteristics (e.g., investment values, which 
represents the transaction value and is used as a proxy for the investment size, and number of 
syndicated investors for each financing rounds); characteristics of the target firms (i.e. location 
and industry market to book values; and fund characteristics (i.e., fund-age and number of funds 
managed by the PE organization before investing in the investee, considered as proxies for fund 
manager experience;  portfolio size, and fund-independency).  Table 1 also includes variables that 
capture the different legal settings during the 1999-2006 investment period in Italy, as explained 
above in section 3. 
 [Insert Table 1 About Here] 
5. Univariate Tests 
 Table 2 reports comparison of means and medians for our main performance measures 
described in Table 1 (ROA differences, EBITDA/Sales differences). These performance 
measures are reported in association with different due diligence time length (i.e., above or below 
10 weeks6) and different types of due diligence (prevalent internal or external DD; consultants’ 
DD; legal DD; accountants’ DD). The comparison of means and median tests are reported for the 
entire sample (178 transactions).  
As reported in Table 2 (Panel A), the target firms for which PE investors spent more time 
on due diligence (i.e., employing more than 10 weeks) show better performance, consistent with 
our first hypothesis (H1), even though the differences are significant only in terms of three-year 
ROA and EBITDA/Sales (the difference in the three-year ROA is significant at the 10% level for 
both the mean and the median; the difference in the tree-year EBITDA/Sales is significant at the 
1% level only for median). Similarly, PE transactions for which PE funds implemented the 
                                                 
6
 We also considered different cut-off periods (e.g., the median) and results did not materially change. 
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majority of due diligence (Panel B) show better firm performance in terms of three-year 
differences (e.g., the difference in the three-year ROA is significant at the 5% level for the 
median, and the three-year EBIDTDA/Sale difference is significant at the 1% level for median 
and 10% level for mean), consistent with our second hypothesis (H2). Panels C–E focus on the 
performance associated with external due diligence: consultants’ due diligence (Panel C), legal 
due diligence (Panel D), and accountants’ due diligence (Panel E). The transactions for which the 
due diligence was delegated to consultancy firms (consultants’ due diligence) or legal firms (legal 
due diligence), do not show significant differences in terms of performance. It is instead puzzling 
to notice worse performance associated with the due diligence delegated to chartered accountants 
(accountants’ due diligence). Only the three-year EBITDA/Sales ratios show a statistically 
significant difference at the 5% level (in terms of mean).  
In Panels F-G of Table 2 we report the comparison tests of means and medians of the time 
spent on due diligence over the Dark period compared with the due diligence effort over the Hope 
and Sun periods. As expected, the Dark period is characterized by a weaker due diligence 
compared with the time spent on due diligence over the Hope and Sun periods and these 
differences are statistically significant in terms of mean and median. As explained in Section 3, 
over the Dark period the higher transaction risk regarding the possibility of entering into a legal 
dispute with the investee may distort the due diligence process by pushing PE investors to focus 
more on selecting non-hostile targets.   
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
6. Multivariate Tests 
In this section we present a number of multivariate tests for the impact of due diligence on 
investment performance. We proceed in three steps. First, we present evidence on the 
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determinants of weeks of due diligence in subsection 6.1. Second, we present evidence of the 
impact of due diligence on ROA and EBITDA/Sales in subsection 6.2. Third, we present 
evidence from subsets of the data based on who carries out due diligence in subsection 6.3. 
Fourth, in subsection 6.4, we present and discuss the results of a number of additional regression 
specifications in order to evaluate and confirm the robustness of our main findings.  
6.1. The Determinants of Due Diligence 
 Because the impact of due diligence on investment performance may be affected by 
endogeneity, we first examine why due diligence is more intensive for some investments but not 
others. In Table 3 we present correlation statistics across select variables in the data to examine 
whether or not there are variables that are correlated with due diligence, but unrelated with ROA 
and EBITDA/Sales. The data highlight the importance of three such variables: the Dark period 
dummy variable, preplanned IPOs, and the number of funds managed by the PE firm at the time 
of investment.  These findings are in line with intuition, since in the Dark period PE investors 
focused their attention primarily towards finding non-hostile target firms (Cumming and 
Zambelli, 2010). Likewise, we expect that preplanned IPOs would impact the intensity of due 
diligence since an investor would want to more intensively examine a target firm that is supposed 
to hopefully undergo the scrutiny of a securities regulatory commission in an IPO (Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Levis, 2011; Cumming and Johan, 2013).  
Finally, in line with Nahata (2008) and Yung (2009), more experienced investors are 
naturally more likely to be more diligent in their due diligence. More experienced investors also 
certify the quality of the entrepreneurial firm upon exit, which can give rise to improvement in 
performance upon sale of the company (Nahata, 2008).  However, our performance measures are 
not recorded at the time of sale of the company but instead within the 1-3 year period after the 
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initial investment (for ROA and EBITDA/Sales).  More experience could lead to greater value 
added in the 1-3 year time period; however, such investor value added is more likely to be 
directed at long term performance to maximize the value of the investee firm at the time of its 
sale, and not at any point in the interim period (the only reason to maximize value in the interim 
period prior to exit would be to report inflated investment values to institutional investors, which 
is something that more experienced investors would not do; see Cumming and Johan, 2013).  In 
short, there is no reason to expect that more experience will affect performance in this 1-3 year 
time horizon other than through the channel of better and more due diligence. Therefore, since 
there is no reason to necessarily expect a direct correlation between these three instruments and 
our performance measures, and given these variables are not significantly correlated with our 
performance measures, we identify them as candidate instruments for our subsequent analyses of 
the relationship between due diligence and investee performance. Of course, instrumental 
variable methods allow consistent estimation when the explanatory variables are correlated with 
the error terms of a regression relationship, but the error term is unknown, so we investigated the 
correlation with the dependent variable as a proxy.  Our findings are quite robust to the use of 
different instruments and exclusion of any one of these three instruments. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 Table 4 presents regressions for the determinants of natural log of the number of weeks of 
due diligence (in this Table we report first stage OLS estimates). We present two models: Model 
1 includes fund dummy variables, year dummy variables, and double-clusters standard errors by 
fund and year, while Model 2 excludes these dummy variables and does not cluster standard 
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errors.7 These alternative models are presented merely for a robustness check in our subsequent 
analyses in Tables 5 and 6. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 The regressions in Table 4 indicate two robust determinants of due diligence. First, 
buyouts require less due diligence and this effect is significant in both Models 1 and 2 at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively, which is expected since buyout transactions focus more on 
established target companies with more readily available information and a longer track record.  
Second, investors that run more funds spend more time on due diligence. This result may 
be attributed to the value of experience that motivates PE investors to implement a more thorough 
due diligence of new deals (in line with Nahata, 2008 and Yung, 2009), or to the constrained 
attention due to a higher number of funds managed (in line with Jääskeläinen et al., 2006). We 
note that this latter variable is an important one, and given that it is not correlated with investee 
performance as discussed above it may represent a useful candidate instrumental variable. 
Another useful candidate as an instrument is the location of the target firm (e.g., we considered 
whether or not the target is located in the same region of the PE funds) or, alternatively, the 
geographic proximity, measured in terms of kilometric distance, of the target to its investor (in 
line with Tian, 2011). As robustness check purposes, we also considered other instruments (see 
Section 6.4. for more details) and the results are not materially different from those reported in 
this Section. 
                                                 
7
  We also considered different specifications of Models 1-2, available upon request, and the results did not 
materially change. For example, in Model 1, we excluded Dark and Hope variables and left the year dummies. 
Moreover, in Models 1-2, we controlled for other fund characteristics (e.g., number of partners, number of 
syndicated investors, international affiliation, lead investor status) and the results are in line with our expectations 
and quite robust with the models reported in this paper. 
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Also, there is some evidence of less due diligence in the Dark period (Model 2) and this 
effect is significant at the 5 % level, but this effect is not significant in Model 1 due to the 
inclusion of the year dummy variables. Similarly there is evidence, significant at the 10% level, 
of more due diligence in the Hope period, but this effect is not significant in Model 2. Preplanned 
IPOs have more due diligence in Model 2, but this effect is not significant in Model 1 due to the 
inclusion of the fund and year dummies. Model 1 highlights that older funds carry out more due 
diligence, arguably due to more experience, and funds with larger portfolios per manager carry 
out less due diligence due to a dilution in the allocation of their time and attention (in line with 
the results highlighted by Hamdouni, 2011 and Jääskeläinen et al., 2006). However, these effects 
are not significant in Model 2.  
6.2. Relationship between Due Diligence and Investment Performance 
 Table 5 presents second stage estimates and includes three panels examining the impact of 
due diligence on the subsequent 3-year ROA (Panel A), subsequent 3-year EBITDA/Sales (Panel 
B), and subsequent 1- and 2-year ROA and EBITDA/Sales (Panel C). Panels A and B each 
present 5 different regression models to check for robustness. We include three regressions with 
the use of the due diligence fitted values from Model 1 in Table 4 (Models 3-5 in Panel A and 
Models 8-10 in Panel B), one regression with the use of the fitted values from Model 2 in Table 4 
(Model 6 in Panel A and Model 11 in Panel B), as well as one regression without fitted values 
(i.e., no control for possible endogeneity), in Model 7 (Panel A) and Model 12 (Panel B). The 
Panel C regressions for 1- and 2-year ROA and EBITDA/Sales use the Table 4 Model 1 fitted 
values; for conciseness we do not report the same sets of models as in Panels A and B for 1- and 
2-year ROA and EBITDA/Sales since the results were not materially different. Alternative 
specifications are available on request. 
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[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 Our data consistently indicate that the number of weeks of due diligence is consistently 
associated with stronger 3-year ROA and EBITDA/Sales performance, consistent with H1. We 
model the effect with the use of logs to account for diminishing changes in returns associated 
with each extra week of due diligence. The effect is statistically significant, at least at the 10% 
level in each of the models in Panels A and B. The most conservative economic significance is 
obtained from the regressions without the endogeneity controls (Models 7 and 12). In those 
estimates, a 1-standard deviation increase in the weeks of due diligence from the average due 
diligence level of 8 weeks gives rise to a 197.44% increase in three-year ROA relative to the 
average three-year ROA in the sample (and this effect is smaller at 113.51% if one starts from the 
maximum level of weeks of due diligence of 15 weeks, and larger at 533.95% if one starts from 
the minimum level of due diligence of 2 weeks).  Put differently, an extra four weeks of due 
diligence is on average associated with a doubling of three-year ROA performance. 
 The effect of due diligence on EBITDA/Sales is similarly consistent in all of the 
regression models, and the economic significance is most conservative in the models that do not 
correct for endogeneity. In those estimates, a 1-standard deviation increase in the weeks of due 
diligence from the average level of due diligence of 8 weeks gives rise to a 52.07% increase in 
three-year EBITDA/Sales relative to the average three-year EBITDA/Sales in the sample (and 
this effect is smaller at 29.94% if one starts from the maximum level of weeks of due diligence of 
15 weeks, and larger at 140.82% if one starts from the minimum level of due diligence of 2 
weeks).  
Panel C of Table 5 shows that the impact of due diligence on EBITDA/Sales ratio is 
significant for the one- and two-years after investment, but the economic significance is higher 
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with each year up to the three-year period after investment for the comparable model (Model 8) 
in Panel B. Due diligence, by contrast, is statistically unrelated to ROA in the one- and two-year 
period after investment.  
The large economic significance and consistent statistical significance of the impact of 
due diligence in Panels A and B is contrasted by the weak economic significance and inconsistent 
statistical significance of all of the control variables.  
Additionally, for robustness purposes, we have considered a number of different 
specifications by including, in the second stage, variables that may be related to the value of 
experience of PE investors and, as such, may have an impact on performance, e.g.: number of 
funds managed, or capital under managed, or portfolio size. We have also considered 
specifications controlling for the value added capacity of PE investors. Additionally, we have 
considered new instruments, e.g., the kilometric distance between the target and the PE investor  
(in line with Tian, 2011) or the time spent in performing the DD in other target firms belonging to 
the same industry and acquired in the same year.  Results remain robust to the inclusion or 
exclusions of the above variables and do not materially change the main findings discussed in this 
Section (the robustness checks that we have performed are explained in greater detail in the 
Section 6.4.). 
6.3. The Role of Different Agents Carrying Out Due Diligence 
In Table 6 we present second stage regressions for various sample-subsets according to 
the specific agent performing the majority of due diligence (e.g., the fund managers or external 
firms). The Models in Table 6 are comparable to the Models 5 and 10 in Table 5. The regressions 
highlight a more pronounced impact on performance associated with the due diligence carried out 
internally by the PE investment managers themselves, consistent with H2. When the majority of 
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due diligence is performed externally by law firms, accounting firms and/or consulting firms 
there is an insignificant relation between weeks of due diligence and performance. These findings 
are consistent with Table 2 (Panel A). For example, when due diligence is primarily performed by 
accountants, on average the performances of investee companies are worse compared to the 
performance of the other transactions for which no accounting firm was hired to perform the due 
diligence, consistent with Models 31 and 32 in Table 6.  
The evidence provided in Table 6 highlights the importance for PE firms to undertake an 
internal due diligence. Our results highlight the existence of apparent agency costs associated 
with the due diligence performed externally by law firms, accounting firms, and consultancy 
firms, and call for future theoretical and empirical research to investigate the mechanisms to 
mitigate agency costs incurred in the delegation of due diligence. 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
6.4. Additional Robustness Checks 
In the course of our analyses we carried out a number of preliminary robustness checks. 
First, we considered longer performance horizons, including four and five years. The findings 
were generally consistent, but to a much greater degree influenced by outliers that are more than 
likely unanticipated and unrelated to due diligence.  Hence, we focus on 3-year performance. 
Second, we considered performance measures provided by the fund managers themselves versus 
financial statement information obtained from official sources filed in accordance with the Italian 
accounting rules. Our performance measures reported herein are those based on the AIDA 
database by Bureau Van Dijk, and we did not find major discrepancies with self-reporting in our 
surveys.  Third, we considered other explanatory variables including but not limited to specific 
contractual terms described in Cumming and Zambelli (2013). The findings are robust (explicitly 
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shown in the Online Appendices 1 and 2 shown at the back of this paper). We note due diligence 
is weakly positively correlated to more detailed contracts in our data, which in part is consistent 
with the findings herein.  We do not include these contractual analyses in the results reported 
herein since the causal link between contracts and due diligence is in need of further empirical 
testing with other datasets. Fourth, in order to evaluate whether the length of DD is affected by 
the involvement of external actors, we have run a number of specifications on the determinant of 
DD, similar to those reported in Models 1 and 2 (Table 4), by including an additional variable to 
control for the impact of  external agents performing the due diligence. Also, we have considered 
other control variables, such as the size of the investee firm and the control power of the PE 
investor (see Section 6.4.1. for details).  We found no significant correlation between the time 
spent on DD and the involvement of external agents performing the due diligence process. For 
brevity reasons we did not report these results because they  do not materially change the main 
findings discussed in the previous sections and  presented in Table 4 (they are available upon 
request). Fifth, we controlled for buyouts versus expansion deals in all of our analyses.  The PE 
funds in the sample do both types of deals, and hence we include them all in the sample.  The 
results are robust to excluding the expansion deals, although not robust to excluding the buyout 
deals as most of the deals are  buyout deals. Furthermore, we run a number of different second-
stage regression specifications in order to  control for the cost of debt and the debt-to-equity ratio 
and  results are in line with the main findings of Tables 5-6 discussed in the paper with reference 
to the impact on performance of DD duration and internal DD. 
To further reinforce the robustness of our main results, we carried out a number of 
additional analyses and tests, as summarized below: 
1. Isolating the effect of due diligence on performance: 
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a. Control for the value added capacity of PE investors; 
b. Control for both the value added capacity of PE investors and size of  Investee 
Firms; 
2. Treatment Effect Model (similar to Heckman selection model); 
3. Two-stage IV regression for the determinants of  internal versus external due diligence; 
4. Propensity Score Matching models, comparing the impact on performance of longer and 
shorter DD, as well as the impact on performance of internal and external DD; 
5. Inclusion or exclusion of different instruments; adoption of a new instrument measuring 
the geographic distance between PE funds and their target companies (“distance km”); 
adoption of a new instrument created by considering the average time spent on 
implementing the due diligence in other target firms active in the same industry and 
acquired in the same year (“dd_weeks_OTHER”;  and “ln_dd_weeks_OTHER”); 
6. Inclusion of other performance measures:  Return on Equity investment (ROE) and IPO 
exit outcomes. 
7. Inclusion of performance measures (ROA,  ROE, and EBITDA/Sales) recorded at the 
time of exit, and the time of investment. 
In the following sub-sections we report the details of the robustness checks mentioned above. 
 
6.4.1. Isolating the Effect of Due Diligence and Controlling for the Size of Target Firms 
As highlighted in the literature, private equity fund managers are actively involved in the 
governance and management of their portfolio companies (see, e.g., Sorensen, 2007) and the 
screening process may depends on the size of the company (Yung, 2009).  In order to isolate the 
impact of DD on investees performance, we performed a number of robustness tests aimed at 
considering the value added capacity of the PE investors, as well as the size of their target firms 
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(see Tables 7-8). Our results remain robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables. 
In particular, consistent with the models reported in Tables 4-5, in Table 7 we show first-stage 
estimates related to the determinants of due diligence and in Table 8 (Panels A, B and C) we 
report second-stage estimates on the impact of the due diligence on investee performance. In all 
Models shown in Tables 7 and 8,  we included a variable that is aimed at capturing the level of 
involvement and control power played by the PE fund manager. In line with Cumming and Johan 
(2013), as a proxy for the PE involvement, we have considered an index given by the sum of veto 
and control rights held by the PE investors (see Table 1 for more details on the specific control 
and veto rights included). Among the control rights, we have considered the right to choose and 
substitute the CEO, the right to add board members,  the right to retain board control, as well as 
other exit rights, such as the first refusal in sale, and IPO registration rights. Among the veto 
rights, we have considered the veto power of the PE investor over various decisions, such as the 
issuance of equity, control changes, asset purchase or asset sale.8 We have included the veto 
rights because they allow the PE fund manager to influence the outcome of a number of 
important business decisions. In Table 7 we show the first stage estimates, while in Table 8 we 
report the second stage estimates of the impact of due diligence on investee performance, after 
controlling for the PE involvement and the size of the target firms (in terms of log of the number 
of employees).9 The results reported in Tables 7-8 are consistent with our main findings discussed 
in the previous sections and further reinforce the results reported in Tables 4-5.10   
 [Insert Tables 7-8 here] 
                                                 
8
  For a recent review of  the control and veto rights held by PE investors, see Zambelli (2014). 
9
  The number of employees was not available for all companies.  
10
  In Table 8 we show the impact of due diligence effort on investee performance, after controlling for the PE 
involvement and value added capacity. We also controlled for  the size of the target firms (in terms of number of 
employees). The number of employees was not available for all companies. For space reasons, we decided to not 
include the additional robustness checks that control for the different size of target firms given the fact that the results 
from these additional robustness tests do not materially change the main findings discussed in the paper. Results are 
available upon request. 
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6.4.2.  Considering Treatment Effect Models for potential sample selection biases 
The decision of performing the majority of DD internally (rather than externally) is a 
choice variable and this may raise sample selection biases.  
In order to address the above issues, we have employed a treatment effect method (similar 
to a Heckman selection model)11 by estimating, in the first step, the probability of having an 
internal due diligence (as a function of investee location and fund characteristics, such as 
portfolio size and legal structure) and, in the second step, the related outcomes in terms of impact 
on firm performance, given the results in the first step. In particular, in Table 9 we report the 
second stage estimates of the treatment effect model for the decision of implementing an internal 
DD (for space reasons, the first stage estimates for the selection equation are not included). In 
Models 1, 2 and 3 we show the impact of DD on ROA 3Y, 2Y, and 1Y differences; in Models 4, 
5 and 6 we show the impact of DD on EBTDA/sales 3Y, 2Y, and 1Y differences, respectively. It 
is worth noting that in the first-step we have considered specifications with only one variable 
(e.g., the geographic distance between the PE fund and target) to keep the model parsimonious, as 
well as specifications with additional variables related to fund characteristics (e.g., lead investor, 
capital under management, fund legal structure, and number of portfolio firms). Given the recent 
evidence on the impact of spatial proximity on VC behavior (see, e.g., Tian, 2011) and contract 
design (e.g., Hirsch and Sharifzadeh, 2009; Cumming and Johan, 2013), it is reasonable to expect 
that the geographic distance between the fund and the target may affect the type of due diligence 
(internal versus external).12 We have also considered specifications with additional selection 
                                                 
11 The model is a treatment model (similar to a Heckman model) with the “treatreg” function in Stata. A nice feature 
of the treatreg function is that it does not have the same restriction as the Heckman regression to have all of the same 
variables in the first step regression, plus extra variables.   
12
 In order to consider the recent evidence (see, e.g., Tian, 2011) on the positive impact of geographic proximity on 
the monitoring of target firms and their performance, in our treatment effect model the variable related to spatial 
proximity has been included both in the selection equation and in the outcome equation. In our data, the geographic 
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criteria related to fund characteristics (e.g., capital under management) to take into account the 
evidence shown in Brown et al. (2008). The second-step results are extremely similar to what is 
reported in the paper without the selection equation. Likewise, the findings remain robust to the 
inclusion of one or more selection criteria to the first-step regression equation (for details, see 
Table 9). 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In order to take  into account potential selection biases regarding the internal versus 
external due diligence, we ran additional robustness tests (not reported in the paper for space 
reasons, but available upon request). For example, we have considered two-step IV methods for 
the determinants of internal versus external due diligence, with the use of instruments (instead of 
a treatreg specification) as in the case discussed for the number of weeks of due diligence. The 
results do not materially change. In particular, we considered two-stage IV regressions by 
estimating, in the first step, the determinants of the internal versus external due diligence and, in 
the second stage, the impact on performance of the internal DD predicted in the first step. In the 
second stage, we have also considered the predicted value of the due diligence time, driven from 
Models 1 and 2 reported in Table 4 of the paper.  The first step regression on the determinants of 
internal due diligence shows (as the most robust finding) that bigger funds (e.g., funds with larger 
portfolio sizes per manager) are more likely to delegate the majority of the due diligence to 
external agents, and this is in line with the evidence shown by Brown et al. (2008). The results of 
the first-step estimates do not materially change the main findings of our study. Likewise, the 
second-step estimates always highlight a positive and significant relationship between due 
diligence time and firm performance. The fitted values for the internal due diligence included in 
                                                                                                                                                              
proximity is significant only in the first step-regression (as a determinant of internal due diligence) but not in the 
second step. 
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the second step are statistically insignificant in all the specifications included in Table 5 Panels A, 
B and C, regardless of the specification adopted in the first step. Similarly, the simple variable for 
internal versus external due diligence (without fitted values) is statistically insignificant in Table 
5, and does not change the inferences drawn regarding the weeks of due diligence.  Hence, we do 
not include such a variable in the reported results to keep the models as parsimonious as possible 
(the results are available upon request).  
Ultimately, as an additional robustness check, we considered Propensity Score Matching 
Models related to the impact of long due diligence (i.e., longer than 10 weeks) versus short due 
diligence. As shown in Table 10, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of longer due diligence is 
positive and significant, in line with the main findings discussed in the paper.13  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6.4.3. Considering other Performance Measures 
For robustness check purposes, we have considered other performance measures, such as 
IRR, Return on Equity (ROE), and IPO exit outcomes.  
Regarding IRRs, however, we have information only for a subsample in our data, as many 
of the deals were not exited at the time of data collection and, at the time of our survey on 
investee performance, the IRR was not provided (or not publicly available) for a number of exited 
investments. Therefore, we are effectively restricted to using ROA and EBITDA/Sales which 
were confirmed by AIDA database and auditor reports in order to use the full sample (and our 
choice is in line with Cao, 2013 and Richard et al., 2009). It is worth noting that different 
measures of operating profitability can be adopted. For example, Florin (2005) employs the EBIT 
                                                 
13
 We have also considered Propensity Matching Models  with reference to the internal versus external due diligence 
and we obtained results in line with the main findings discussed in the paper. 
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to Sales ratio; Kabir and Roosenboom (2003) employ both the EBIT to Sales ratio and the 
EBITDA to Sales ratio. However, the latter ratio is more appropriate to assess the operating profit 
margin from a strategic and managerial point of view, as the EBITDA represents the portion of 
firm’s operating profit that is not affected by depreciation, amortization, interest and taxes. 
Moreover, since the EBITDA is adjusted to remove the impact of noncash expenses (e.g., 
depreciation and amortization), the profit margin expressed in terms of EBITDA/Sales is also 
more appropriate to better evaluate the firm efficiency (see, e.g., Richard et al., 2009). 
Given the relevant number of missing values related to IRRs, as an approximation, for 
robustness check purposes we have collected additional information from AIDA database on the 
Return on Equity (ROE) of all target firms included in our dataset and estimated the impact of 
DD duration on ROE. Additionally, we have considered other performance measures represented 
by the IPO exit outcomes (collected from our third survey and confirmed by the information 
publicly available in “Borsa Italiana”). Results are shown in Table 11 (Panel A).  Ultimately, in 
Panel B of Table 11, we have considered the investee performance at the time of exit (instead of a 
three-year period). Since the decision to exit is a non-random event, we also included 
specifications with a treatment of potential sample selection for the exit decision by predicting, in 
the first step,  the probability of an exit (as a function of the investment year) and estimating, in 
the second step, the outcome from that exit (in terms of investee performance).14  The results 
reported in Table 11 are in line with the main findings provided in the paper. A thorough DD is 
                                                 
14
 In the second stage, we have considered the predicted value of the due diligence time, driven from Models 1 and 2 
reported in Table 4 of the paper. 
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associated with higher IPO exit outcomes, higher ROE, as well as higher firm performance at the 
time of exit.15 
 [Insert Table 11, Panels A, B] 
6.4.4. Different Instruments 
For robustness check purposes, we have considered other specifications such as excluding 
year dummy variables in Models 3 and 4 while leaving the dark and hope dummies, and the 
effect of due diligence remains highly significant. Additionally, we considered different second-
stage regression specifications, by including in the second stage variables related to investor 
characteristics (e.g., fund age, capital under management and number of funds managed by the 
PE organization at the time of the first investment in the target firm). We ran a number of 
different specifications and overall the impact of due diligence effort on firm performance 
remains highly significant. The second stage estimates reported in Panel A of Table 12 are in line 
with the findings discussed in the paper and presented in Table 5.  Overall, our main findings are 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the above control variables (see Table 12 Panel A).  
We further included other possible instruments to control for endogeneity and our findings 
are quite robust to the inclusion and exclusion of different instruments. For example, we ran the 
regression specifications shown in Tables 4-5 by including a new instrument based on the 
kilometric distance between the fund and the target company, in line with Tian (2011). The 
results from the first and second stage regressions are consistent with the main findings discussed 
                                                 
15
  It is worth noting that, for robustness check purposes, we also considered the impact of DD on performance at the 
time of first investment. The findings do not show significantly different results and the external DD is associated 
with worse firm performance. Ultimately, with reference to the internal versus external DD, we have also considered  
the role of PE size in terms of capital under management, number of firms included in the portfolio and number of 
funds managed by  PE investors. The results are consistent with our main findings discussed in the paper and internal 
DD remains associated with better firm performance (both in terms of ROA three-year difference and EBITDA/Sales 
three-year difference).  
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in the paper (see Table 12, Panel B). Ultimately, we considered the adoption of an alternative new 
instrument given by the time spent on performing the due diligence in other target firms 
belonging to the same industry and acquired in the same year (see Table 12, Panel C).  The 
impact of due diligence effort on firm performance remains relevant and significant and the main 
finding discussed in the paper are confirmed. 
 [Insert Table 12, Panels A – B - C] 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper we have investigated the efficacy of due diligence and quantified the time-
value of due diligence in the context of private equity (PE) investments. We have shown a link 
between the time spent on due diligence and the future performance of investee firms, measured 
in terms of changes in the return on assets (ROA) and EBITDA/sales ratios over the first three 
years of the investment.  
Very few academic studies, if any, have analyzed the economic value of due diligence and 
its crucial role in predicting better future performance of the investee firms. Based on a novel and 
unique hand-collected dataset comprising the majority of PE investors in Italy, our results show 
that due diligence enables selection of better investees in the portfolio and strongly support the 
view that a diligent due diligence is associated with improved firm performance. Moreover, our 
data show that the due diligence carried out internally by fund managers has a more pronounced 
impact on performance. No significant impact emerges with reference to the due diligence 
performed by external agents, i.e., accounting firms, law firms or consultants.  
Our study reinforces the evidence highlighted by Brown et al. (2008) who argue that due 
diligence is a source of alpha for hedge funds. Likewise,  the due diligence has a crucial role and 
a high economic value in the context of PE.  
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Overall,  our findings contribute to advance the knowledge on the role of the selection and  
evaluation process underlying the acquisition of a target firm. One important implication for PE 
investors and advisors derived from our study is that, in a PE setting, the time spent on due 
diligence is a source of value in terms of observed better future performance of investee firms. A 
second important implication for PE fund managers is that the time spent on due diligence is 
especially worth it when the majority of that time is spent in implementing a DD internally. 
Ultimately, our findings suggest the existence of apparent agency costs underlying the due 
diligence delegated to external agents. More theoretical and empirical research is needed in order 
to enrich the knowledge on agency costs associated with the delegation of due diligence, 
especially in the context of PE where the opportunity cost of time is enormous and investors may 
be tempted to rush the evaluation process underlying the due diligence or to delegate it outside in 
order to allocate more attention to managing and adding value to their existing portfolio firms. 
Further research could likewise examine bargaining over contractual terms during the due 
diligence process to better understand how contracts are negotiated in practice and their impact 
on performance. 
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Table 1. Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics  
This table defines the variables and provides summary statistics. The full sample comprises of 178 observations, of which 116 are leveraged 
buyouts and 63 expansion financing deals. Summary statistics are provided for the entire sample. The data derive from the survey and interviews 
with the PE investors carried out in 2005, as described in the body of the paper. 
 
 
Variable Definition 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
  
Dependent Variables 
 Firm Performance Indicators  
Return on Asset 
(Roa) Three-Year 
Difference 
Difference (in %) between Roa at the third year after 
the investment and Roa at Investment Date.  Source: 
AIDA database by Bureau Van Dijk 178 0.77 0.86 13.27 -71.16 55.80 
Ebitda/Sales Three- 
Year Difference  
 
Difference between Ebitda/Sales at the third year 
after the investment and Ebitda/Sales at Investment 
Date. Source: AIDA database by Bureau Van Dijk 178 2.65 1.87 12.12 -31.02 73.39 
Return on Asset 
Two-Year Difference 
 
Difference (in %) between the ROA at the second 
year after the investment and the Roa at the 
investment date. Source: AIDA database by Bureau 
Van Dijk 178 -0.27 0.10 9.90 -71 34.9 
Ebitda/Sales Two-
Year Difference 
 
Difference between Ebitda/Sales at the second year 
after the investment and Ebitda/Sales at the 
investment date. Source: AIDA database by Bureau 
Van Dijk 178 1.58 1.38 8.62 -31.02 65.08 
Return on Asset 
One-Year Difference 
 
Difference (in %)  between the ROA at the first year 
after the investment and the ROA at the investment 
date. Source: AIDA database by Bureau Van Dijk 178 0.73 0.21 7.59 -38.31 38.52 
Ebitda/Sales One-
Year Difference 
 
Difference between Ebitda/Sales at the first year after 
the investment and Ebitda/Sales at the investment 
date. Source: AIDA database by Bureau Van Dijk 178 1.15 0.82 5.98 -18.87 53.65 
  
Key-Explanatory Variables 
 
Due Diligence Length and Types 
Ln (Number of 
Weeks of Due 
Diligence) 
Natural Log. of number of weeks actively spent on 
due diligence.  Source: Author’s surveys 178 1.93 1.95 0.54 0.69 2.71 
Prevalent Internal 
Fund Due Diligence 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the PE investor spent 
more than half of the time doing due diligence checks 
themselves as opposed to using consultants, lawyers, 
and/or accountants. Source: Author’s surveys 178 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 
Consultants’ Due 
Diligence 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the PE delegated the 
majority of due diligence to a consultancy firm 
specialized in audit, tax, and advisory services (e.g., 
KPMG). Source: Author’s surveys 178 0.66 1 0.48 0 1 
Legal Due Diligence 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a legal due diligence 
was performed by a professional lawyer. Source: 
Author’s surveys 178 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 
Accountants’ Due 
Diligence 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the PE investor 
delegated the majority of due diligence to a 
professional chartered accountant. Source: Author’s 
surveys 178 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
  
Other Control Variables 
 
 
Market Conditions        
12-Month Stock 
Market Return 
The return on the stock market for the 3–12 month 
horizon preceding the investment date.  Source: 
MSCI 178 0.08 0.14 0.17 -0.32 0.41 
MSCI Annual Return 
over Investment 
Horizon 
The annualized public equities return for Italy over 
the contemporaneous investment horizon.  Source: 
MSCI 178 -0.05 -0.15 0.33 -0.57 0.72 
Legal Settings (Source: Cumming and Zambelli, 2010, 2013) 
       
Dark Period 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the “Dark” period 
during which leveraged buyouts are illegal (January 
1999– September 2001 for the transactions in the 
data set). 178 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
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Hope Period 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the “Hope” period 
during which it is announced by the Italian 
Parliament that buyouts will soon be legal (October 
2001 – December 2003). 178 0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Sun Period 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the “Sun” period 
during which buyouts are legal (January 2004, and 
ending at July 2006 in the data set). 178 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Investee Characteristics        
 
Industry Market / 
Book 
The industry market-to- book value for publicly 
traded firms at the time of investment. 178 2.42 1.88 1.66 0.38 11.58 
 
Geographic 
proximity (Same 
Region) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the investee firm is 
located in the same region of the PE investor. 178 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Deal Structure Characteristics & Value Added Capacity of PE investors      
Level of PE control 
and involvement 
(Sum of Control and 
Veto Rights) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sum of control and veto rights contractually held 
by the PE investor  (i.e., right to choose board 
members,  right to retain board control,  right to add 
board members,  right to choose the CEO and other 
key managers, right to  substitute the CEO and key 
managers, right to add coinvestors, drag along, 
redemption, right of first refusal, cosale, liquidation 
rights, ipo rights,  veto on issuance of equity, veto on 
asset purchase, veto on asset sale, and veto on 
ownership changes). 178 10 12 3.7 1 16 
Investor Characteristics  (Source: Cumming and Zambelli, 2010, 2013) 
     
Age of PE investor 
 
The age of the fund in years from date of formation 
to date of first investment in the investee firm. 178 5.68 4.00 8.51 0.00 74.00 
No. of Funds Under 
Management  Number of funds managed by the same PE firm. 178 1.88 1.00 1.44 1.00 7.00 
Limited Partnership   A dummy variable equal to 1 for a limited partnership fund. 178 0.545 1.000 0.499 0 1 
Portfolio Size per 
Manager 
The portfolio size (number of investees) per manager 
at the time of first investment 178 2.47 1.40 5.40 0.50 37.50 
Investment Characteristics (Source: Cumming and Zambelli, 2010, 2013) 
      
Buyout 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is a 
leveraged buyout (LBO). 178 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Investment Value 
The total amount invested by the PE investor as at 
July 2006. 178 9685 4450 21254 90 183400 
Preplanned IPO 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the PE investor 
preplanned the IPO. 178 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Preplanned Trade 
Sale 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the PE investor 
preplanned a trade sale. 178 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Ebitda/Sales at the 
Investment Year Ebitda/Investment Ratio at the Investment Year. 178 10.33 10.00 8.61 -52.19 41.41 
Syndication  The number of syndicated PE investors. 178 1.067 1.000 1.201 0 6 
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Table 2. Comparison of Means and Median Tests  
 
This table compares the mean and median statistics for the differences on Return on Asset after 1, 2, or 3 years from the investment date. Variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A focuses on the length of due diligence; 
Panels B-E focus on the types of due diligence employed. Panels F-G focus on the due diligence time spent over the different legal setting characterizing the Italian market. For medians we use a Wilcoxon test; for means 
we adopt a standard t-test. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Group 1 -- Due Diligence > 10 weeks 
 
Group 2 -- Due Diligence ≤ 10 weeks 
 
Difference Tests 
 
Variable 
 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Stand. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Stand Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Difference on Return on 
Asset (Roa) 3 year 
44 3.54 1.22 10.64 -11.39 55.80 134 -0.14 0.22 13.94 -71.16 46.82 1.84* 3.019 * 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 3 
year 
44 4.73 2.25 13.98 -22.34 73.39 134 1.97 1.87 11.42 -31.02 64.39 1.19 12.2168*** 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 2 year 
44 1.98 0.15 7.8 -9.39 31.06 134 -1.01 10.4 0.22 -71 34 2.02** 0.27 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 2 
year 
44 2.51 2.00 8.86 -23.02 47.46 134 1.27 1.37 8.55 -31.02 65.08 0.82 0.27 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 1 year 
44 2.43 1.27 8.02 -15.19 38.52 134 0.17 0.00 7.40 -38.31 37.56 1.66* 1.93 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 1 
year 
44 1.13 1.30 4.48 -18.87 6.62 134 1.16 0.81 6.41 -11.53 53.65 0.03 1.27 
 
Panel B 
 
Group 1 -- Prevalent Internal Due Diligence 
 
Group 2 -- Prevalent External Due Diligence 
 
 
Difference Tests 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
Difference on Return on 
Asset (Roa) 3 year 83 1.332236 1.22 17.14046 -71.16 55.8 95 0.2759321 -0.39 8.641843 -42.72 29.37 0.51 5.08** 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 3 
year 83 4.58179 2.25 16.42524 -31.02 73.39 95 0.9610022 1.83 5.93581 -10.64 28.25 1.90* 20.96*** 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 2 year 83 -0.81 0.84 13.46 71.16 34.09 95 -0.19 -0.39 5.13 -18.85 18.66 0.64 1.67 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 2 
year 83 2.285619 2.13 11.87627 -31.02 65.075 95 0.9587632 1.30 4.015238 -8.72 13.78 0.97 1.7700 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 1 year 83 0.8998241 1.27 9.633122 -38.31 38.52 95 0.5761868 0.00 5.252216 -19.45 26.85 0.27 2.7* 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 1 
year 83 1.834251 0.81 7.904743 -18.87 53.65 95 0.5557874 0.80 3.47658 -9.84 8.7 1.36 0.2600 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Panel C 
 
 
Group 1 -- Consultants’ Due Diligence 
 
Group 2 -- No Consultants’ Due Diligence 
 
Difference Tests 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
Difference on Return on 
Asset (Roa) 3 year 117 0.94 0.84 9.08 -42.72 46.82 61.00 0.43 1.17 18.97 -71.16 55.80 0.20 0.02 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 3 
year 117 2.94 1.87 10.97 -22.34 73.39 61.00 2.10 0.53 14.16 -31.02 64.39 0.40 0.04 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 2 year 117 0.49 0.10 5.68 -18.85 31.06 61.00 -1.6 1.27 14.98 -71 34.09 1.04 0.03 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 2 
year 117 1.79 2.06 6.75 -23.02 47.46 61.00 1.17 1.34 11.44 -31.02 65.08 0.39 0.8000 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 1 year 117 0.65 0.00 5.44 -19.45 38.52 61.00 0.87 1.27 10.63 -38.31 37.56 0.15 0.2200 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 1 
year 117 0.93 0.80 4.07 -18.87 8.70 61.00 1.59 0.74 8.55 -11.53 53.65 0.57 0.2000 
               
 
Panel D 
 
Group 1 -- Legal Due Diligence 
 
Group 2 -- No Legal Due Diligence 
 
Difference Tests 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
  
              
Difference on Return on 
Asset (Roa) 3 year 121 1.06 0.88 9.14 -42.72 46.82 57.00 0.15 0.68 19.42 -71.16 55.80 0.33 0.03 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 3 
year 121 2.89 1.87 10.81 -22.34 73.39 57.00 2.13 0.53 14.62 -31.02 64.39 0.35 0.01 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 2 year 121 0.65 0.09 5.87 -18.8 31.06 57.00 -2.24 0.10 15.19 71.2 34.09 1.38 0.26 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 2 
year 121 1.77 1.80 6.68 -23.02 47.46 57.00 1.16 1.37 11.80 -31.02 65.08 0.37 0.35 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 1 year 121 0.82 0.11 5.50 -19.45 38.52 57.00 0.53 1.26 10.83 -38.31 37.56 0.19 0.03 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 1 
year 121 1.02 0.81 4.06 -18.87 8.70 57.00 1.42 0.18 8.82 -11.53 53.65 0.32 0.71 
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Table 2 – continued 
               
 
Panel E 
 
 
Group 1 -- Accountants’ Due Diligence 
 
 
Group 2 -- No Accountants’ Due Diligence 
 
 
Difference Tests 
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
  
              
Difference on Return on 
Asset (Roa) 3 year 19 0.09 1.18 5.45 -11.39 10.17 159 0.85 0.68 13.92 -71.16 55.80 0.46 0.53 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 3 
year 19 -0.28 0.70 5.38 -9.51 9.38 159 3.00 1.80 12.66 -31.02 73.39 2.06** 0.01 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 2 year 19 -0.22 -0.17 4.45 -7.71 10.17 159 0.28 0.099 10.38 -71.16 34.09 0.04 0.004 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 2 
year 19 0.31 1.40 4.97 -8.72 13.85 159 1.73 1.55 8.96 -31.02 65.08 1.06 1.23 
Difference on Return on 
Asset 1 year 19 0.87 0.74 3.74 -8.85 10.17 159 0.71 0.00 7.94 -38.31 38.52 0.15 0.53 
Difference on Ebitda/Sales 1 
year 19 1.32 0.00 4.57 -7.84 8.70 159 1.13 0.81 6.14 -18.87 53.65 0.16 0.07 
Table 2 – continued 
               
 
Panel F 
 
 
DARK  period  
 
 
SUN  period 
 
 
Difference Tests 
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
  
              
Weeks spent on DD 37 5.89 6 3.0 1 14 85 8.18 8 3.99 1 20 3.5*** 18.8*** 
 
Panel G 
 
 
DARK  period  
 
 
HOPE  period 
 
 
Difference Tests 
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Stand Dev. Min Max Mean Median 
  
              
Weeks spent on DD 37 5.89 6 3.0 1 14 56 7,47 6.5 3.36 1 14 2.37** 4.9** 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents correlations across select dependent variables, potentially endogenous due diligence variables, potential instruments and other explanatory variables. Correlations greater than 0.13, 0.15 and 0.20 in 
absolute value are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Correlations greater than 0.15 in absolute value are highlighted with an underline. Correlations among potential instruments that are 
significant at the 5% level with the number of weeks of due diligence but not the two main dependent variables (EBIT/Sales Difference and ROA Difference) are highlighted in bold. 
 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
 
[15] 
 
EBITDA / Sales Difference from 3 Years relative to Investment 
Year [1] 1.00               
ROA Difference from 3 Years to Investment Year [2] 0.50 1.00              
Number of Weeks of Due Diligence [3] 0.19 0.16 1.00             
Dark Period [4] -0.14 -0.01 -0.24 1.00            
Hope Period [5] -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.35 1.00           
Investment Value [6] 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.05 1.00          
Buyout Dummy [7] 0.14 0.06 0.03 -0.12 -0.11 0.19 1.00         
Industry Market / Book [8] -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.45 -0.22 -0.10 -0.13 1.00        
Same Region 
 
[9] 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 1.00       
Return 1 year prior 
 
[10] 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.15 -0.66 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.00      
EBIT / Sales in Most Recent Period Prior to Investment [11] -0.53 -0.31 -0.11 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.12 0.08 0.02 0.01 1.00     
Preplanned IPO [12] -0.08 -0.04 0.16 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.11 0.06 1.00   
 
 
Preplanned Acquisition [13] 0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.37 -0.17 0.01 -0.12 -0.15 -0.34 1.00   
Fund Age [14] -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.17 -0.07 0.23 0.15 -0.07 -0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.12 0.14 1.00  
 
Portfolio Size Per Manager [15] -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.14 0.38 0.05 -0.08 0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 1.00 
Number of Funds [16] 0.14 0.14 0.35 -0.12 -0.08 0.11 0.33 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.05 0.22 -0.07 
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Table 4. First Stage Regressions to Explain the Number of Weeks of Due Diligence 
 
This table presents OLS estimates of the number of weeks of due diligence in Model 1, and the natural log of the number of weeks of due diligence in Model 2. Variables 
are as defined in Table 1. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.     
 
 
 
  
Model 1:  
Ln (Number of Weeks Due Diligence) 
Model 2: 
 Ln (Number of Weeks Due Diligence) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Dark Period -0.1283 -0.51 -0.2946 -2.57** 
Hope Period 0.1872 1.75* -0.0312 -0.25 
Investment Value 1.86E-06 1.12 2.30E-06 1.10 
Buyout Dummy -0.1927 -2.15** -0.1687 -1.81* 
Industry Market / Book -0.0212 -1.00 -0.0099 -0.38 
Same Region -0.0072 -0.09 -0.0253 -0.30 
Return 1 year prior 0.3544 1.18 -0.0202 -0.06 
EBITDA / Sales in Most Recent Period Prior to 
Investment -0.0018 -0.70 -0.0059 -1.32 
Preplanned IPO -0.0128 -0.10 0.1914 2.13** 
Preplanned Acquisition 0.0747 0.67 0.0900 0.98 
Fund Age 0.0490 2.12** -0.0026 -0.52 
Portfolio Size Per Manager -0.0089 -4.15** -0.0092 -1.17 
Number of Funds 0.0256 1.89* 0.1285 4.39*** 
Year of Investment Dummies? Yes No 
Fund Dummies? Yes No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes No 
Constant 1.8385 55.15*** 1.8898 12.36*** 
Number of Observations 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.4142 0.1542 
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Table 5. Impact of Due Diligence on Three-Year ROA and Three-Year EBITDA/Sales 
 
This table presents second stage OLS estimates of the impact of due diligence on Three-Year ROA in Panel A and EBITDA / Sales in Panel B. Estimates are for the difference between the year 3 performance values versus 
the year of investment values. Variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Panel A. Three-Year ROA 
 
Model 3  
(With Outliers) 
Model 4  
(Outliers Removed) 
 
Model 5  
(No Year and Fund 
Dummies) 
 
Model 6 
 (No Clustering) 
Model 7  
(No Endogeneity Controls) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 24.9441 1.67* 17.3146 2.09** 5.4510 3.10***      
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 2)        5.3885 2.28**    
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence          3.8341 2.03** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 2.5370 0.59 3.4617 0.89 4.3838 1.54 4.5397 1.30 4.4879 1.28 
Dark -1.9701 -0.40 1.7224 0.32 2.4681 1.44 2.6100 0.88 2.0829 0.71 
Hope -4.5435 -1.10 0.5027 0.12 -0.7276 -0.34 -0.6766 -0.26 -0.7096 -0.27 
Buyout Dummy 2.7514 0.86 -0.9458 -0.74 1.6932 1.03 1.6280 0.76 1.6205 0.76 
Market / Book 0.2545 0.32 -0.2520 -0.46 -0.2635 -0.74 -0.2679 -0.40 -0.2623 -0.39 
Fund Age      -0.0363 -0.52      
Portfolio Size Per Manager      0.0156 0.17      
Year of Investment Dummies? Yes Yes No No No 
Fund Dummies? Yes Yes No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes No No 
Constant -49.6825 -1.57 -32.5327 -1.86* -10.12083 -3.43*** -10.1514 -1.83* -7.0361 -1.48 
Number of Observations 178 175 178 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.2565 0.2739 0.0461 0.0121 0.0061 
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Table 5 continued 
 
 Panel B. Three-Year EBITDA / Sales 
 
Model 8  
(With Outliers) 
 
Model 9  
(Outliers Removed) 
Model 10  
(No Year and Fund Dummies) 
Model 11 
 (No Clustering) 
Model 12  
(No Endogeneity Controls) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 51.6339 3.91*** 31.75703 2.69*** 5.8626 1.84*      
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 2)       5.8626 2.80***    
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence         3.4862 2.07** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 1.6229 0.53 2.284831 0.81 5.2018 5.86*** 5.5064 1.77* 5.5461 1.77* 
Dark 7.2669 0.51 2.456892 0.57 -3.0799 -1.62 -2.7309 -1.04 -3.5275 -1.34 
Hope 0.3077 0.10 -3.53788 -0.78 -3.8548 -3.09*** -3.8764 -1.67* -3.9684 -1.69* 
Buyout Dummy 11.2664 2.59*** 6.336529 2.55** 2.8999 1.63 2.7054 1.43 2.6895 1.41 
Market / Book 1.1934 1.98** 0.7217392 1.72* 0.1555 0.34 0.1563 0.26 0.1632 0.27 
Fund Age     -0.0532 -1.73*      
Portfolio Size Per Manager    -0.0755 -1.80*   
Year of Investment Dummies? Yes Yes No No No 
Fund Dummies? Yes Yes No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes No No 
Constant -105.5339 -3.93*** -63.4908 -2.50** -8.2649 -1.32 -8.7494 -1.78* -3.9619 -0.94 
Number of Observations 178 175 178 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.2887 0.2425 0.1065 0.0721 0.0533 
 
Panel C. One-Year and Two-Year ROA and EBITDA / Sales  
Model 13 
 (Year 1 - Investment Year  
ROA) 
 
Model 14  
(Year 1 - Investment Year 
EBITDA/Sales) 
 
Model 15 
 (Year 2 - Investment Year 
 ROA) 
Model 16 
 (Year 2 - Investment Year 
EBITDA / Sales) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 
 
5.3909 
 
0.51 
 
29.6533 
 
1.74* 
 
8.0861 
 
0.95 
 
37.2893 
 
2.03** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 1.0449 0.68 -0.5575 -0.25 1.1450 0.42 0.7254 0.22 
Dark -0.8743 -0.24 5.3286 1.43 -1.9361 -0.42 3.8732 1.11 
Hope -3.8877 -2.17** 0.4274 0.26 -5.9671 -1.59 -2.8181 -0.99 
Buyout Dummy 1.0697 0.34 7.2720 2.28** 2.3351 0.69 8.9877 2.17** 
Market / Book 0.0490 0.07 0.5702 1.55 0.0947 0.2 0.8876 1.57 
Year of Investment Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -10.2356 -0.46 -60.7341 -1.72* -17.4284 -0.94 -76.0893 -1.95* 
Number of Observations 178 178 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.3062 0.2813 0.2759 0.2925 
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Table 6. Regression Analyses for Different Agents Carrying Out Due Diligence 
 
This table presents OLS estimates of the impact of due diligence on Three-Year ROA in Panel A and EBITDA / Sales in Panel B. Regressions are based on the different subsamples for different agents carrying out due 
diligence: primarily the fund, whether or not consultants are used, whether or not external law firms are used, and whether or not external accounting firms are used. Estimates are for the difference between the year 3 
performance values versus the year of investment values. Variables are as defined in Table 1. Where variables are excluded in the regressions it was due to necessity in the subsamples (e.g., in the case of consultants in the 
Dark period, for example). *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Three Year ROA with subsets of the data by Due 
Diligence Types 
 
Model 17  
Prevalent Internal Fund Due 
Diligence 
Model 18  
Prevalent External Due 
Diligence 
Model 19  
Consultants’ Due Diligence 
Model 20 
No Consultants’ Due Diligence 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 10.4179 2.38** -2.0003 -0.83 1.2482 0.93 15.4722 2.92*** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 1.7337 0.37 7.0056 2.90*** 5.4701 1.44 1.9902 0.3 
Dark 4.0836 1.5 -0.0685 -0.04 0.6783 0.17 7.6875 3.47 
Hope 1.8136 0.33 -3.2929 -2.45 -3.3307 -2.03** 5.9219 0.52 
Buyout Dummy 1.7968 1.03 -0.3378 -0.15 1.1721 0.72 2.6648 0.68 
Market / Book -0.4613 -1.06 -0.4333 -0.47 -0.7483 -0.88 0.5346 0.36 
Portfolio Size Per Manager -4.3185 -0.49 -0.0233 -0.18 -0.0247 -0.18 2.3067 0.66 
Year of Investment Dummies? No No No No 
Fund Dummies? No No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -14.73654 -1.59 7.0884 1.33 0.7338 0.25 -36.0129 -3.64*** 
Number of Observations 83 95 117 61 
Adjusted R2 0.0650 0.0560 0.0583 0.1350 
 
  
 
Model 21 
Legal Due Diligence 
Model 22  
No Legal Due Diligence 
Model 23 
Accountants’ Due Diligence 
Model 24 
No Accountants’ Due Diligence 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 1.4851 1.49 20.6433 3.87*** -2.9945 -1.38 7.3279 3.07*** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 5.6285 1.6 1.1184 0.15 1.2143 0.52 5.2251 1.53 
Dark 0.5670 0.14 7.6147 1.97** -8.5574 -2.90*** 4.0426 2.14** 
Hope -3.1003 -2.08** 5.9196 0.44 -0.2985 -0.08 -0.2108 -0.07 
Buyout Dummy 1.4498 0.91 2.3813 0.72 7.1457 2.23** 1.8869 0.87 
Market / Book -0.6640 -0.87 0.9600 2.40** 1.8999 0.4 -0.3574 -0.83 
Portfolio Size Per Manager -0.0178 -0.13 9.6564 0.32 -0.0893 -2.15** 0.5490 1.09 
Year of Investment Dummies? No No No No 
Fund Dummies? No No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0978 -0.02 -55.6239 -1.31 -1.3937 -0.12 -14.9546 -4.03*** 
Number of Observations 121 57 19 159 
Adjusted R2 0.0607 0.1530 0.3674 0.0650 
Table 6 continued 
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 Panel B. Three Year EBITDA/Sales with subsets of the data by 
Due Diligence Types 
 
Model 25  
Prevalent Internal Fund Due 
Diligence 
Model 26  
Prevalent External Due 
Diligence 
Model 27  
Consultants’ Due Diligence 
Model 28 
No Consultants’ Due Diligence 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 8.6556 1.95* -0.7937 -0.29 2.2609 0.57 14.5982 2.86*** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 5.9963 1.13 4.4972 2.59*** 7.0100 2.98*** 2.0069 2.66*** 
Dark -6.7325 -1.72* -0.3567 -0.21 -3.4372 -0.95 -2.0532 -0.84 
Hope -8.7708 -2.68*** 0.3611 0.32 -2.8506 -1.12 -5.0015 -0.43 
Buyout Dummy 4.7131 2.23** 0.2005 0.12 2.5596 1.21 5.1071 1.61 
Market / Book -0.0235 -0.04 -0.0670 -0.13 0.5192 0.75 -0.2324 -0.82 
Portfolio Size Per Manager 0.0123 0.00 -0.0750 -2.05** -0.0775 -3.07*** -1.0594 -0.92 
Year of Investment Dummies? No No No No 
Fund Dummies? No No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -11.8661 -1.76* 3.0945 0.54 -2.5726 -0.31 -20.8755 -2.90*** 
Number of Observations 83 95 117 61 
Adjusted R2 0.1806 0.0663 0.0790 0.2438 
 
  
 
Model 29 
Legal Due Diligence 
Model 30  
No Legal Due Diligence 
Model 31 
Accountants’ Due Diligence 
Model 32 
No Accountants’ Due Diligence 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 2.4960 0.79 19.6158 3.17*** -3.6668 -3.63*** 7.6630 2.02** 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 6.6034 3.05*** 2.1164 0.6 7.2562 0.91 5.6062 1.77* 
Dark -3.2735 -0.92 -1.6074 -0.35 4.6261 1.41 -3.1858 -1.48 
Hope -2.6719 -1.14 -6.4581 -1.26 3.3402 1.2 -4.4112 -2.09** 
Buyout Dummy 2.6306 1.15 3.4693 2.07** 7.4089 1.77 2.4935 1.99** 
Market / Book 0.5042 0.76 0.0109 0.1 -0.1428 1.68 0.1458 0.37 
Portfolio Size Per Manager -0.0793 -0.51 6.4580 0.43 -0.1674 0.03 0.2693 0.24 
Year of Investment Dummies? No No No No 
Fund Dummies? No No No No 
Clustering by Fund and Year? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.2395 -0.48 -39.5266 -1.44 1.1806 0.15 -11.7207 -1.67* 
Number of Observations 121 57 19 159 
Adjusted R2 0.079   0.2917  0.7432 0.1315 
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Table 7. First Stage Regressions  on the determinants of Due Diligence duration, controlling for the value added capacity of PE investors 
This Table presents First-stage  OLS estimates of the log of the  number of weeks considering the impact of the controlling power of the PE investor and the size of target 
firms. Variables are as defined in Table 1.   *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7     
Due Diligence Determinants 
controlling for the impact of the different value 
added capacity of PE investors and target size 
 
(First Stage Estimates) 
1  
Ln (Number of Weeks 
Due Diligence) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 2  
Ln (Number of 
Weeks Due 
Diligence) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 3 
Ln (Number of 
Weeks Due 
Diligence) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 4 
Ln (Number of 
Weeks Due 
Diligence) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Dark Period -0.129 -0.301*** -0.0795 -0.317*** 
 (-0.502) (-2.649)  (-2.729) 
Hope Period 0.185* -0.0754 0.174 -0.0889 
 (1.668) (-0.588) (0.590) (-0.673) 
Investment Value 1.76e-06 2.72e-06 1.78e-06 2.54e-06 
 (1.067) (1.296) (0.989) (1.195) 
Buyout Dummy -0.193** -0.168* -0.190** -0.160* 
 (-2.136) (-1.819) (-2.201) (-1.707) 
Industry Market-to-Book Value -0.0215 -0.00699 -0.0213 -0.00664 
 (0.00) (-0.269)  (-0.254) 
Same Region -0.00772 -0.0364 -0.00629 -0.0359 
 (0.00) (-0.430)     (-0.421) 
Return 1 year prior 0.358 -0.100 0.320 -0.129 
 (1.146) (-0.319) (1.148) (-0.399) 
EBITDA / Sales in Most Recent Period Prior to 
Investment 
-0.00180 -0.00554 -0.00200 -0.00574 
 (-0.671) (-1.243) (-0.704) (-1.279) 
Preplanned IPO -0.0122 0.188** -0.0238 0.186** 
 (-0.0914) (2.112) (-0.186) (2.068) 
Preplanned Acquisition 0.0756 0.114 0.0707 0.123 
 (0.671) (1.238) (0.636) (1.325) 
Fund Age 0.0473 -0.00232 0.0484 -0.00334 
 (1.585) (-0.479) (1.544) (-0.655) 
Portfolio Size Per Manager -0.00879*** -0.00835 -0.00886*** -0.00880 
 (-4.253) (-1.071) (-6.322) (-1.120) 
Number of Funds  0.0252 0.117*** 0.0328 0.120*** 
 (1.583) (3.947) (1.460) (3.978) 
Sum of veto and control rights 0.00237 -0.0193* 0.00146 -0.0196* 
 (0.204) (-1.784) (0.116) (-1.807) 
Ln Employees of Investee Firm   0.0190 0.0220 
   (0.637) (0.643) 
Year Dummies YES NO YES NO 
Fund Dummies YES NO YES NO 
Double Clustering by Fund and Year YES NO YES NO 
Constant 1.819 2.103*** 1.718*** 1.999*** 
  (10.87) (8.629) (8.073) 
Observations 178 178 177 177 
R-squared  0.653 0.1653 0.654 0.234 
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Table 8. Second-stege estimates showing the impact on investee performance, after controlling for the value added capacity of PE investors and target size 
This Table presents second-tage estimates of the impact on investee performance considering the effect of  . Panel A shows the impact on three-year ROA; Panel  B shows the impact on three-year Ebitda/Sales. Variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics 
in parentheses.    *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 – PANEL A 
 3Y ROA DIFFERENCE 
IMPACT ON  3Y ROA Difference 
(Second-stage estimates) 
 5  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
6  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
 7  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
8 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
9 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
10 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
11  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
12 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
13 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
14 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
15 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
 16 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
             
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 7, 
Model 1) 
32.07* 23.00** 4.903*** 4.826**         
 
(1.845) (2.000) (2.909) (1.980)         
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 7, 
Model 2) 
    10.87**        
 
    (2.196)        
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 7, 
Model 3) 
      34.66** 25.56** 5.115*** 5.036**   
 
      (2.020) (2.298) (2.809) (2.066)   
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 7, 
Model 4) 
          11.76**  
 
          (2.395)  
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence      3.436*      3.397* 
 
     (1.790)      (1.766) 
             
MSCI Return Over Horizon 2.516 3.444 3.905 4.055 3.308 3.920 1.109 3.165 3.382 3.770 2.926 3.686 
 (0.583) (0.883) (1.360) (1.144) (0.929) (1.103) (0.258) (0.734) (1.111) (1.060) (0.821) (1.032) 
Dark -1.008 3.353 2.298 2.419 4.369 1.947 5.242 0.0273 1.688 2.125 4.345 1.561 
 (-0.189) (0.548) (1.517) (0.811) (1.329) (0.661)  (0.00457) (0.900) (0.702) (1.305) (0.522) 
Hope -4.183 1.643 -0.833 -0.762 -0.152 -0.798 -3.556 -1.605 -1.018 -0.930 -0.236 -1.002 
 (-0.993) (0.343) (-0.393) (-0.290) (-0.0573) (-0.304) (-0.208) (-0.514) (-0.457) (-0.353) (-0.0890) (-0.379) 
Buyout Dummy 3.888 -0.0184 1.761 1.712 1.733 1.720 4.652 0.666 2.353 2.096 2.084 2.112 
 (1.090) (-0.00952) (0.961) (0.801) (0.812) (0.803) (1.317) (0.475) (1.173) (0.965) (0.963) (0.969) 
Market / Book 0.538 -0.0246 -0.238 -0.244 -0.262 -0.235 0.588 0.0511 -0.224 -0.231 -0.253 -0.221 
 (0.689) (-0.0453) (-0.677) (-0.361) (-0.389) (-0.348) (0.652) (0.0935) (-0.489) (-0.342) (-0.377) (-0.327) 
Sum of veto and control rights -0.963 -0.758 -0.261 -0.259 -0.0940 -0.300 -1.047 -0.800 -0.266 -0.268 -0.0836 -0.317 
 (-1.486) (-1.297) (-1.300) (-0.922) (-0.309) (-1.081) (-1.622) (-1.352) (-1.168) (-0.954) (-0.275) (-1.137) 
Ln Employees Investee Firms       1.483 0.0133 1.107 0.936 0.891 0.950 
       (0.761) (0.0119) (0.611) (1.175) (1.122) (1.189) 
Fund Age   -0.0332      -0.0857    
   (-0.471)      (-1.024)    
Portfolio Size Per Manager   0.0306      -0.00815    
   (0.352)      (-0.113)    
Fund dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
             
Year dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
             
Clustering by Fund and Year YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO 
             
Constant -53.37* -35.60* -6.550* -6.528 -20.48* -3.344 
-66.53* -40.57** -12.50 -11.86 -27.16** -8.172 
             
Observations 178 175 178 178 178 178 177 174 177 177 177 177 
             
Adjusted R squared 0.265 0.282 0.0508 0.011 0.0162 0.0070 0.294 0.287 0.063 0.060 0.068 0.054 
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TABLE 8– PANEL B 3Y EBITDA/SALES DIFFERENCE 
IMPACT ON  3Y EBITDA/SALES 
(Second-stage estimates) 
Model 17  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 18  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 19  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 20 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 21 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 22  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 23  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 24 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 25  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 26  
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 27 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Model 28 
Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
       
      
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted, Table 7, Model 1)) 
59.64*** 56.72*** 5.367* 5.330**         
 (3.991) (3.695) (1.908) (2.471)         
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted,  Table 7, Model  2)) 
    8.932**        
     (2.023)        
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted, Table 7, Model 3) 
      63.42*** 60.45*** 5.469* 5.441**   
       (3.998) (3.656) (1.930) (2.513)   
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted, Table 7, Model 4) 
          9.582**  
           (2.177)  
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence      3.064*      3.038* 
      (1.79)      (1.768) 
MSCI Return Over Horizon 1.607 1.672 4.754*** 5.033 4.461 4.945 1.033 1.546 4.467*** 4.914 4.279 4.875 
 (0.555) (0.622) (9.464) (1.604) (1.404) (1.562) (0.321) (0.515) (3.350) (1.556) (1.339) (1.529) 
Dark 8.344 8.061* -3.233* -2.911 -1.759 -3.671 7.680*** 5.629 -3.649** -3.088 -1.730 -3.907 
  (1.763) (-1.756) (-1.103) (-0.599) (-1.400) (2.883) (1.451) (-2.064) (-1.150) (-0.580) (-1.463) 
Hope 0.652 1.045 -3.953*** -3.958* -3.552 -4.062* 0.989 1.800 -4.053*** -4.019* -3.553 -4.153* 
 (0.194) (0.184) (-2.804) (-1.704) (-1.503) (-1.735) (0.0752) (0.588) (-3.009) (-1.720) (-1.496) (-1.761) 
Buyout Dummy 12.58** 11.16* 2.963 2.787 2.805 2.795 13.41** 11.98* 3.332* 2.980 2.977 2.999 
 (2.530) (1.947) (1.586) (1.473) (1.474) (1.465) (2.492) (1.967) (1.683) (1.544) (1.536) (1.540) 
Market / Book 1.495** 1.282* 0.180 0.180 0.171 0.192 1.589** 1.390* 0.192 0.189 0.177 0.202 
 (2.562) (1.746) (0.393) (0.301) (0.285) (0.319) (2.326) (1.769) (0.385) (0.315) (0.293) (0.333) 
Portfolio Size Per Manager 0.123 0.129 -0.0391    0.137 0.143 -0.0608**    
 (1.399) (1.528) (-0.983)    (1.372) (1.651) (-2.634)    
Sum of veto and control rights -0.969 -0.895 -0.243 -0.252 -0.155 -0.318 -1.017 -0.927 -0.248 -0.257 -0.145 -0.327 
 
(-1.355) (-1.225) (-0.902) (-1.015) (-0.573) (-1.287) (-1.449) (-1.272) (-0.885) (-1.029) (-0.531) (-1.314) 
Ln Employees Investee Firm       -0.226 -0.796 0.617 0.383 0.357 0.403 
       (-0.186) (-0.859) (0.652) (0.542) (0.502) (0.565) 
Fund Age   -0.0726*    
  -0.102**    
   (-1.798)    
  (-2.116)    
Fund dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Year dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Clustering by Fund and Year YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Constant -111.4*** -105.8*** -4.967 -5.252 -13.58 -0.0484 -117.6*** -108.8*** -8.261 -7.507 -16.94 -2.094 
 (-4.082) (-3.780) (-1.124) (-0.875) (-1.265) (-0.00929) (-4.804) (-4.156) (-1.034) (-1.074) (-1.517) (-0.329) 
Observations 178 175 178 178 178 178 177 174 177 177 177 177 
R-squared 0.300 0.290 0.112   0.0724 0.0616 0.0569 0.316 0.299 0.117 0.112 0.104 0.096 
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Table 9.  Treatment Effect Models for the decision of implementing an Internal DD (second-stage estimates) 
This Table shows the estimates from a treatment model, with the first stage (not reported) modeling  the probability of having an internal DD as a function of the kilometric distance between the target and the fund, the portfolio size, and fund 
characteristics, and the second stage (reported) determining the factors that affect the performance of investee firms, given the results in the first stage. T-statistics in parentheses.    *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 Treatment Effect Models Second-Stage Treatment Effect Models 
 Second-stage estimates  (1) ROA 3Y Diff. 
 (2) 
ROA 2Y Diff. 
 (3) 
ROA 1Y Diff. 
 (4) 
 Ebitda/Sales 3Y Diff. 
 (5) 
Ebitda/Sales 2Y Diff. 
 (6) 
 Ebitda/Sales 1Y Diff. 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted, Table 4, Model 1) 5.621  2.37** 4.837 2.75** 3.100   2.30**    6.120    2.92**    4.323   2.90**    2.400   2.30**    
MSCI_total_return 4.182    1.20 2.005 0.77 1.301   0.65 4.819    1.57    1.811    0.83    -.0426 -0.03    
Dark 2.309   0.76 1.526 0.68 2.395 1.39 -2.536    -0.93    -2.866  -1.47    -1.008    -0.74    
Hope 0.625    -0.24 -1.216 -0.63 0.848 0.57 -3.432    -1.50    -2.512    -1.54    1.590  1.39    
Buyout 1.614  0.76 1.955 1.24 1.396 1.15 2.545    1.36    1.568    1.18    0.776   0.83    
Market / Book -0.279 -0.42 -0.155 -0.32 -0.187 -0.50 0.1624     0.28    0.0410    0.10    -0.010    -0.03    
Fund Age 0.029 -0.24 -0.015 -0.17 -0.103 -1.52 -0.064   -0.61    -0.0218    -0.29    0.009   0.17    
Portfolio Size 0.048 0.25 0.039 0.27 0.040 0.37 -0.028   -0.16    0.0153    0.12    0.069   0.80    
Distance Km 0.003 0.78 0.001 0.57 0.001 0.63 0.0032   1.07    0.0041    1.97**   0.003  1.92**    
Internal DD 1.280 0.37 -1.015 -0.40 -0.106 -0.06 0.533  0.15    -0.6443  -0.24    0.776 0.45    
Constant -11.849 -2.04 -10.297 -2.39** -6.228 -1.89* -10.111 -1.98    -7.245    -1.99    -5.663 -2.22    
Number of Observations 178 178 178  178 178 178 
  55 
Table 10. Propensity Score Matching  for long DD versus shorter DD 
This Table shows results of Propensity Score Matching models for long DD (grater than 10 weeks) versus shorter DD. Models 1-2 and 5 consider the following observable matching  information: MSCI return over horizon,   Dark,  Hope,  
buyout dummy, Market / Book,  fund age,  distance in km between target and fund, lead investor dummy; Models 3-4 and 6  consider the following observable information:  MSCI  return over horizon,   Dark,  Hope,  buyout dummy, Market / Book.  
Model  6 considers  the following observable information: MSCI  return over horizon, and Market / Book. 
 
Long vs. short DD 
 Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
 
 
 Impact on Firm Performance using Propensity Score Matching Model 
 
 
( 1) 
ROA 3Y difference 
 
(2) 
ROA 2Y difference 
 
(3) 
ROA 3Y difference 
 
 
(4) 
ROA 2Y difference 
 
 (5) 
ROA 1Y difference 
 
 
(6) 
EBITDA/SALES  3Y difference 
 
Long DD (ATE) 
 
 
4.370** 
 
4.970*** 
 
4.406* 
 
3.134* 
 
4.624*** 
   
5.197* 
 
 
(2.75) 
 
(3.49) 
 
(1.93) 
 
(1.88) 
 
(4.57) 
 
(1.65) 
 
Number of Observations 178 
 
178 
 
178 
 
178 
 
178 
 
178 
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Table 11.  Impact  of DD Duration on Other Performance Measures and Other Performance Timing 
This Table presents second-stage estimates of the impact of DD duration on other performance measures. Panel  A shows the impact on IPO exit outcomes (Models 1-3), as well as the impact on  three-year ROE differences (Model 4 is similar to the 
specification presented in Model 5 of  Table 5; Models 5-6 are similar to the specification presented in Model 6, Table 5) . Panel B shows the impact on ROA, ROE and EBITDA/SALES recorded at the time of exit.  Variables are defined in Table 1.   T-
statistics in parentheses.    *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 11 - Panel A :  IPO and ROE Second-Stage Estimates  
 Impact of DD duration on IPO exit outcomes Impact of DD duration on ROE   3Y difference 
 Second-Stage Estimates 
 (1) 
logit 
 
 
 (2) 
logit 
 (3) 
Heckman Probit Selection 
 
 
(4)  
Double clustering by fund and 
year, No Year and Fund 
Dummies 
 (5) 
 No double clustering, 
no year and fund 
dummies 
 (6) 
No double clustering, no 
year and fund dummies 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence 
(Fitted, Table 4, Model 2) 
 
7.013    2.08** 6.970    2.06 **      2.440   1.71 * 25.429    2.52**    23.692    2.57**    25.429   2.66**    
MSCI_total_return 2.165    1.87* 2.082    1.79    1.091    1.70*    -.8037 -0.22    -0.196   -0.03    -0.804   -0.11    
Dark 3.575    2.43** 3.412    2.27*   1.192  1.00    7.5268    1.99*    7.374    1.13    7.527    1.14    
Hope -0.391 -0.43 -0.4126   -0.45    -0.408  -0.72    2.458    0.72    2.785    0.53    2.458    0.46    
Buyout 0.9283    1.05 0.8739    0.98      1.273   0.55    1.213    0.28    1.273   0.29    
Market / Book 0.093 0.63 0.090   0.60    0.033   0.38    -0.800          - -0.832   -0.62    -0.800   -0.59    
Portfolio Size -0.573   -0.64 -0.645  -0.68    -0.474    -0.92    0.231   0.86      0.230    0.60    
N. of funds -1.035    -1.88*    -0.965    -1.69*    -0.308    -1.30          
Fund Age   -0.047    -0.40    -0.030    -0.46    -0.099    -0.73      -0.099    -0.40    
Fund Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Year Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Double Clustering by Fund and Year NO NO NO NO NO NO 
N. of syndicated investor     0.045 0.33          
Constant -15.197    -2.23 **   -14.834    -2.17**    -5.081   -1.69    -51.233    -2.49**    -47.785   -2.44**    -51.233    -2.52 **   
Number of Observations 150 150 157 178 178 178 
R-squared 1.1668 0.1692       0.0458 0.0428 0.0458 
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Table 11 - Panel  B:  Performance at Time of Exit Impact on Firm Performance , measured at time or exit - Second-Stage Estimates 
 Second-Stage Estimates 
 (7) 
Impact  on  ROA  recorded at the 
time of  exit (double clustering by 
fund and year,  no Year and Fund 
Dummies) 
 
 (8) 
Impact on ROA at the time of exit, 
with control for sample selection 
biases for the decision of exit (using 
the “treatreg” command in Stata) 
 
(9) 
Impact  on  EBITDA/SALES  
recorded at the time of  exit (OLS, 
Clustered SE by Fund) 
 
 
(.10) 
Impact  on  EBITDA/SALES  recorded at 
the time of  exit with control for sample 
selection biases for the decision of exit (using 
the “treatreg” command in Stata) 
 
 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model 
1) 
    4.292666    2.55** 3.011046    1.69* 
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, Model  
2) 5.403774    4.38***    5.393153     2.51**        
MSCI_total_return 8.074677    2.23**    8.388335    2.00**    6.37659    1.13    7.886671    2.81** 
Dark 1.706252    0.66    2.079738    0.79    -5.396404    -1.75* -4.313342    -1.73* 
Hope -1.633067    -1.63    -1.488414    -0.68 -6.626974    -2.04* -6.086175    -2.97** 
Buyout -.0344121     -0.02    .0052219    0.00 1.43396    0.93    .456812    0.28 
Market / Book .2777362    2.21**    .2755038    0.78 .4608759    1.69    .4015963    0.79 
Portfolio Size .0315435    0.27    .0337145      0.74     
Fund Age -.1605734     -1.50    -.1709404    -1.83 -.1681064    -3.08**    -.1160093    -1.28 
Financial  crisis dummy 7.256506    1.90*    7.445651    1.52 1.066826    0.37      
Constant -5.982094    -3.81***    4.950598    0.48 7.432412    1.95* 9.750145    1.59 
Number of Observations 131 131 
131 
131 
R-squared 0.0675  
0.1311 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 12.  Robustness checks considering different type of instruments  
This Table reports second-stage estimates showing the impact of DD duration on firm performance by considering different instruments. Panel A considers the inclusion in the second stage of different types of fund 
characteristics  (e.g., number of funds managed,  number of portfolio firms). Panel B considers the impact on firm performance derived by the adoption of a new instrument (i.e., the kilometric distance between the fund and 
the target company). Panel C considers the adoption of another alternative new instrument given by the time spent on performing the due diligence in other target firms belonging to the same industry and acquired in the 
same year.    T-statistics in parentheses.    *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
PANEL A: Control for fund characteristics IMPACT ON ROA 3Y DIFFERENCE IMPACT ON EBITDA/SALES  3Y DIFFERENCE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Second-Stage Estimates Double 
Clustering 
Double 
Clustering 
Double 
Clustering 
Double 
Clustering 
OLS OLS Double 
Clustering 
Double 
Clustering 
Double 
Clustering 
OLS OLS 
            
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, 
Table 4, Model  1) 
41.73** 42.34* 4.525** 5.967*** 4.525*  72.77*** 69.61*** 70.76*   
 (2.028) (1.987) (2.599) (4.542) (1.699)  (3.213) (3.025) (1.931)   
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, 
Table 4, Model  2) 
     15.85***    24.76*** 15.15*** 
      (2.925)    (2.935) (3.155) 
MSCI_total_return 2.331 2.157 4.103 4.514 4.103 3.679 1.161 1.208 1.194 4.456 4.842 
 (0.542) (0.501) (1.538) (1.471) (1.145) (1.030) (0.413) (0.477) (0.481) (1.404) (1.530) 
Dark -3.107 -1.728 2.439 2.814** 2.439 5.991* 7.562 -4.188 -4.193 1.832 0.0724 
 (-0.452) (-0.291) (1.437) (2.281) (0.802) (1.762)  (-0.924) (-0.928) (0.534) (0.0240) 
Hope -8.913** -8.911** -0.550 -0.577 -0.550 -0.00216 -4.999 -15.88*** -16.49** -3.734 -3.201 
 (-2.416) (-2.372) (-0.276) (-0.236) (-0.206) (-0.000817) (-1.313) (-2.907) (-2.200) (-1.590) (-1.365) 
Buyout 5.083 5.279 1.090 0.829 1.090 1.002 14.34** 12.89** 13.19 5.509** 2.465 
 (1.422) (1.309) (0.699) (0.490) (0.474) (0.438) (2.514) (2.013) (1.470) (2.412) (1.216) 
Market / Book 0.831 0.833 -0.316 -0.126 -0.316 -0.0645 1.896** 1.676 1.692 0.366 0.364 
 (1.159) (1.063) (-0.914) (-0.824) (-0.463) (-0.0949) (2.058) (1.610) (1.476) (0.604) (0.605) 
Preplanned IPO -1.068   -1.906  -4.238   0.218  -5.343** 
 (-0.656)   (-1.108)  (-1.602)   (0.155)  (-2.280) 
Preplanned Acquisition -0.290   2.190  1.553   -0.293  0.596 
 (-0.126)   (0.710)  (0.654)   (-0.0772)  (0.283) 
Fund Age -2.733** -2.775*** -0.0530 -0.0555 -0.0530 -0.0887 -3.371 -3.236 -3.304 -0.0458 -0.126 
 (-2.634) (-3.026) (-0.765) (-0.870) (-0.426) (-0.721) (-1.650) (-1.594) (-1.326) (-0.417) (-1.157) 
Portfolio Size 0.272 0.264 0.0209 0.0183 0.0209 0.0992 0.213 0.216 0.221 0.0639 0.0142 
 (1.344) (1.643) (0.228) (0.215) (0.110) (0.110) (1.271) (1.336) (0.836) (0.366) (0.0835) 
N. of Funds  0.0148 0.677  0.677  -2.787 -2.582  -2.769**  
  (0.0154) (1.241)  (0.799)  (-1.408) (-1.237)  (-2.058)  
Fund dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO 
            
Year dummies YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO 
            
Clustering by Fund and Year YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES NO NO 
Constant -73.56* -74.71* -9.066*** -11.13*** -9.066 -30.46*** -132.7*** -126.6*** -131.3* -43.39*** -25.79*** 
 (-1.846) (-1.838) (-3.204) (-9.309) (-1.557) (-2.766) (-3.399) (-3.176) (-1.930) (-2.714) (-2.643) 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 175 175 178 178 
R-squared 0.271 0.270 0.050 0.058 0.050 0.073 0.313 0.303 0.303 0.116 0.128 
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PANEL B: Adoption of a new  instrument given by the 
kilometric distance between funds and their target firms 
IMPACT ON ROA 3Y DIFFERENCE IMPACT ON EBITDA/SALES  3Y DIFFERENCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (.8) 
Second-Stage Estimates Double Clustering Double Clustering OLS OLS Double Clustering Double Clustering Double Clustering OLS 
         
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, 
Model  1, with the adoption of the instrument “km 
distance” instead of  “same region”) 
4.748*** 5.873***   38.41*** 46.41** 5.740*  
 (3.817) (4.510)   (3.651) (2.051) (1.843)  
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, 
Model  2,  with the adoption of the instrument “km 
distance” instead of  “same region”) 
  10.91** 15.94***    9.461** 
   (2.374) (2.938)    (2.304) 
MSCI_total_return 4.203 4.566 3.873 3.657 2.171 1.945 5.258*** 5.036 
 (1.439) (1.475) (1.098) (1.024) (0.655) (0.665) (5.251) (1.599) 
Dark 2.770** 2.788** 4.417 6.018* 5.305 2.570 -3.115 -1.557 
 (2.405) (2.235) (1.363) (1.770)  (0.674) (-1.634) (-0.538) 
Hope -0.365 -0.597 -0.262 0.00757 0.357 -3.464 -3.876*** -3.594 
 (-0.156) (-0.244) (-0.0995) (0.00286) (0.114) (-1.111) (-3.057) (-1.528) 
Buyout -0.00129 0.826 1.687 1.004 8.607** 8.962 2.897 2.745 
 (-0.000829) (0.494) (0.791) (0.439) (2.045) (1.387) (1.650) (1.441) 
Market / Book -0.182*** -0.127 -0.276 -0.0638 0.930 1.324 0.155 0.152 
 (-2.711) (-0.843) (-0.409) (-0.0939) (1.536) (1.365)  (0.252) 
Preplanned IPO -1.916 -1.887  -4.258  -0.798   
 (-1.158) (-1.114)  (-1.610)  (-0.529)   
Preplanned Acquisition 2.438 2.194  1.548  1.611   
 (0.775) (0.710)  (0.652)  (0.575)   
Fund Age -0.0767 -0.0550  -0.0891  -2.110 -0.0750*  
 (-1.125) (-0.861)  (-0.724)  (-1.108) (-1.800)  
Portfolio Size 0.0245 0.0175  0.1000 0.0225 0.0854 (0.329)  
 (0.301) (0.204)  (0.522) (0.283) (0.572) -0.0543*  
N. of Funds 0.831*     -2.059   
 (1.830)     (-1.134)   
Fund dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
         
Year dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
         
Clustering by Fund and Year YES YES NO NO YES YES YES NO 
         
Constant -9.723 -10.94*** -21.40** -30.63*** -78.22*** -83.79** -8.008 -16.08* 
  (-8.807) (-2.195) (-2.779) (-3.766) (-2.051) (-1.313) (-1.847) 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.063 0.058 0.048 0.073 0.269 0.285 0.105 0.091 
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PANEL C: Adoption of  a new instrument in given by the time 
spent on DD in other firms in the same industry and same year 
IMPACT ON ROA 3Y DIFFERENCE IMPACT ON EBITDA/SALES  3Y DIFFERENCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Second-Stage Estimates Double Clustering Double Clustering OLS NO Double Clustering OLS 
       
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, 
Model  1, with  the adoption of a  new  instrument “Other 
DD”) 
4.601*** 3.537**   5.285*  
 (2.740) (2.064)   (1.685)  
Ln Number of Weeks Due Diligence (Fitted, Table 4, 
Model  2 with  the adoption of a  new  instrument “Other 
DD”) 
  7.294* 9.348**  6.169* 
   (1.968) (2.268)  (1.864) 
MSCI_total_return 4.577 4.211 4.676 4.719 5.679*** 5.740* 
 (1.547) (1.533) (1.330) (1.317) (4.318) (1.828) 
Dark 2.207 2.185 3.262 3.949 -2.911 -2.609 
 (1.210) (1.217) (1.041) (1.218) (-1.543) (-0.932) 
Hope -0.805 -0.581 -0.662 -0.545 -3.956*** -3.948* 
 (-0.359) (-0.285) (-0.251) (-0.205) (-3.025) (-1.678) 
Buyout 1.681 0.959 1.634 0.871 2.695 2.698 
 (1.038) (0.600) (0.762) (0.377) (1.536) (1.409) 
Market / Book -0.265 -0.327 -0.276 -0.111 0.156 0.152 
 (-0.739) (-0.970) (-0.408) (-0.162) (0.323) (0.251) 
Preplanned IPO    -2.739   
    (-1.079)   
Preplanned Acquisition    1.950   
    (0.816)   
Fund Age -0.0337 -0.0539  -0.0646   
 (-0.477) (-0.752)  (-0.523)   
Portfolio Size 0.00785 0.0146  0.0459   
 (0.0806) (0.154)  (0.240)   
N. of Funds  0.812     
  (1.594) 
 
    
Fund dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO 
       
Year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO 
       
Clustering by Fund and Year YES YES NO NO YES YES 
       
Constant -8.372*** -7.207** -13.96* -17.64** -7.553 -9.317 
 (-2.892) (-2.532) (-1.746) (-2.059) (-1.210) (-1.305) 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 178 
R-squared 0.039 0.044 0.038 0.055 0.097 0.081 
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Figure 1. Survey Procedure  and Timing  
This Figure summarizes the three-stage survey employed to collect the data underlying this paper.  
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APPENDIX: Data Collection, Response Rate and Representativeness of our Database 
 
In this section we describe the methodology employed to collect our data, as well as present 
summary statistics of the PE investments carried out in Italy over the 1999-2006 period, and the 
associated divestments occurred over the 2000-2012 period. Part A of this Appendix describes the 
methodology underlying our dataset. It describes in greater detail the survey procedure, the 
response rate we obtained and the survey-integrations we carried out to maximize the 
representativeness of our ultimate sample. Part B discusses sample representativeness by describing 
a number of representativeness tests and potential sample selection bias. 
Part A. Data Collection Methods  
The primary source of information underlying our database is represented by a three-stage 
survey of PE deals carried out from 1999 to 2006 (investment period), and PE divestments realized 
from 2000 to 2012 (divestment period).  
(a) Survey Procedure 
We collected the data by undertaking a three-stage survey of international and local venture 
capitalists actively involved in Italy over the 1999-2006 period. For each survey we employed a 
sequential mixed mode (SMM) survey approach (see De Leeuw 2005 and Dillman et al. 2009 for 
details), in combination with the “Total Design Method” (TDM), developed by Dillman (1978) 
specifically for mail and telephone surveys. The sequential mixed mode survey (SMM) is a 
particular survey procedure that recommends the adoption of a different survey mode in sequential 
phases.16 To better highlight the research framework and time frame underlying our study, in the 
following sub-section we summarize the entire survey procedure employed to collect our database. 
                                                
16
 With the sequential mixed mode approach, the non respondents to a mail survey (phase 1) are contacted and 
requested to answer the questionnaire through a different survey mode, e.g., web survey (phase 2). Thereafter, the non 
respondents of phase 2 are contacted and requested to answer the questionnaire through a different mode (e.g., a 
telephone or a face-to-face interview). Recent studies show that this survey methodology significantly improves the 
response rate (see, e.g., De Leeuw, 2005; Dillman et al., 2009). 
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1st Survey - In October 2005 we prepared a first survey on PE investment cycle 
(characterized by a four-page questionnaire) and conducted a pilot study in order to test its efficacy 
and clearness. The feedbacks on our pilot study helped us review the questionnaire. The ultimate 
version of the questionnaire was sent in December 2005. In order to minimize potential sample 
biases, we sent the questionnaire to all members of the Italian Venture Capital Association (AIFI), 
which at that time recorded 88 full members.17 In the first place, we administered our survey by 
post and devoted particular attention to following all the steps highlighted by Dillman (1978). The 
purpose of our first survey was to gather detailed and unique information on investment 
characteristics, screening criteria of target firms, due diligence procedure, deal structure and 
governance mechanisms employed by international and local PE investors active in Italy, as well as 
exit rights and exit expectations. After eliminating double-counted investors and various non-
applicable replies that we received in the subsequently weeks (e.g., some investors were new, other 
investors were not active in the PE sector but only in the early stage sector), we identified 57 
investors actively involved in the PE industry. This number was in line with the number of active 
investors published by the PEM database and PEM Statistics in 2005. After performing our mail 
survey, only 5 PE investors replied (response rate of 9%) and provided us with detailed information 
on 19 target firms. In line with the suggestions of Dillman et al. (2009), a few months later we 
contacted the non respondents to the mail survey and asked them to answer the questionnaire via 
fax (or e-mail). Thereafter, 8 PE investors replied (response rate of 14%) providing us with 
                                                
17
 According to AIFI statistics published in October 2005, the total number of AIFI members was 88. According to the 
PEM database, the total number of investors actively involved in the PE sector was lower (57). However, the 
information about the specific identity of the investors active in the PE sector was not publicly available. Therefore, we 
decided to send the questionnaire to all 88 AIFI members, being aware of the fact that this list was not entirely 
applicable to our survey (some investors were new, others were not actively involved in the PE industry because they 
were specialized in start-up financing only). For our mail survey, we followed all the steps and suggestions 
recommended by Dillman (1978), devoting particular attention on the content of the package that was sent to each 
investor along with the questionnaire. Each investor received a package containing: a four-page questionnaire, a cover 
letter containing the motivation underlying the research project and a presentation of the authors’ main research; a 
signed confidential agreement; a glossary of the PE terminology included in the questionnaire, and a reward promise 
made by the authors in terms of follow-up reports summarizing the results of the survey. 
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complete information on additional 49 PE investee firms. In June 2006, we contacted the non-
respondents once again in order to ask their permission to perform a face-to-face interview in their 
office. Additional 14 investors (response rate 24%) agreed to partake in our survey and provided 
full information about 110 target firms. By the end of August 2006, we completed the interview 
process related to our first survey and collected detailed data on PE investments in 178 target firms 
acquired in Italy over the period from January 1999 to 2006 (second quarter). For each investee 
firm, we gathered information on target companies, screening procedure, investor rights and 
governance mechanisms employed by PE investors.  
2nd Survey - Normally, PE fund managers exit their investments in 3-5 years (see, e.g., 
Cumming and Johan 2009). In order to investigate exit outcomes, we waited for another three years 
and a half to allow PE funds to exit their investee firms. In January 2010, we started a second 
survey of the same 27 PE investors included in our sample, with the aim of collecting information 
on the development of the investee firms included in our sample and gather additional information 
on exited investments, associated investment returns (in terms of IRR), and exit expectations for the 
non-exited investments. Upon request, 19 PE firms replied to our second survey directly via e-mail 
(response rate of 70%), providing us with information on the performance of their investments in 93 
target firms. The remaining 8 PE firms (30%) agreed to answer the second survey only trough a 
face-to-face interview. By the end of July 2010, we completed the scheduled interviews and we 
collected information on exit outcomes of additional 85 target firms. By the end of our second 
survey, we collected detailed information on 127 divestments, which occurred from January 2000 
to December 2009. For each divestment we recorded the following information: exit routes (i.e., 
IPO, trade sale, secondary sale, buyback, write-off), divestment values, exit years, and associated 
investor returns (in terms of IRR). For each non-exited investments, we gathered information on 
exit expectations of PE investors (e.g., expected year, expected divestment route and value, as well 
as expected IRR returns). By the end of our second survey, in December 2010, our dataset included 
51 non-exited investments performed by 20 PE funds.  
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3rd Survey - In order to have a more complete picture of the exited investments, we waited 
for three more years to allow the remaining PE funds to exit their investee firms. In January 2013, 
we started our third survey by contacting the remaining 20 PE investors included in our database. 
Our purpose was to collect information on additional divestments, exit routes, exit outcomes, and 
firm performances. Upon request, 5 PE investors replied promptly to our mail survey, providing us 
with detailed information on their divestments in 12 target firms. The remaining 15 investors 
accepted to answer the questionnaire through an interview, after which we collected information on 
39 target firms. By the end of our third survey (March 2013), our database included 150 
divestments, occurred over the period from January 2000 to December 2012. We also monitored the 
performance of the venture-backed firms that went public over the same divestment year, and 
collected information on potential post-IPO bankruptcies, legal investigations, and the delisting 
occurred until December 2012. 
(b) Survey Integration and Response Rates 
In order to validate, correct and integrate the information gathered through our three-stage 
survey, we considered a number of secondary sources. First, we compared our data with the 
Statistics Report provided by the Italian Venture Capital Association (AIFI), available at the AIFI 
website, in combination with two additional private equity databases: a) the Private Equity Monitor 
(PEM®) dataset, developed by AIFI in association with Università Cattaneo – LIUC, and b) Venture 
Economics database. With this first comparison we cross-checked, and eventually corrected, the 
information we received on investment characteristics (i.e., target firm, location, investment year, 
industry, invested amounts and divestment values). Second, we considered the AIDA database by 
Bureau Van Dijk to collect information on financial performances of the target firms included in 
our database, e.g., Return on Assets (ROA) Ratios, and EBITDA to sales ratios, as well as the 
balance sheets of the target firms included in our database, their Debt to Equity ratios, and the cost 
of debt over the 1999-2006 period. Third, we collected further information on market conditions, by 
looking at Datastream by the Thomson Corporation, MSCI database, and Borsa Italiana. We 
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integrated our database with important control variables related to market returns, and industry 
market to book values. Fourth, we considered additional sources of information in order to make 
sure that our dataset included the majority of the investments listed in each fund website, as well as 
minimize potential sample biases and avoid the risk of having a sample biased toward the most 
successful PE deals. Among these additional sources, we checked investor websites, financial 
reports provided by investors, and the most relevant economic press release. In so doing, we 
gathered important information about fund characteristics (i.e., age, location, portfolio size, capital 
under management, legal structure, independency, number of partners, executives and directors).  
The response rates associated with our survey are reported in Table A.1, Panel A. Despite 
the difficulties associated with the implementation of a three-stage survey on confidential 
information, we obtained a high response rate. With reference to the PE market as a whole, we 
obtained a total response rate of 47% (27 over 57 investors actively involved in the PE industry in 
2005). Considering the buyout sub-sector, our survey covers 84% of the buyout investors active in 
Italy by the end of 2005 (21 over 25 PE funds). Considering the total number of buyout transactions 
reported in the PEM® Statistics, our dataset comprises 38% of the buyouts carried out in Italy over 
the 1999-2006 period (see Table A.1, Panel A). These response rates compare favorably with 
previous surveys in the finance field (e.g., Brau and Fawcett, 2006, who received a total response 
rate of 19%; Graham and Harvey, 2001, who obtained a 9% response rate).  
 
Part B. Sample characteristics and Sample Representativeness 
Our ultimate dataset includes 178 target firms, acquired by 27 private equity organizations 
covering approximately 85% of the buyout investors operating in Italy from 1999 to 2006 
investment period. The data include detailed information on 150 exits realized over the 2000-2012 
divestment period. Our dataset includes both quantitative and qualitative information about: a) 
investment and divestment values; b) deal structure; c) valuation models employed by investors; d) 
returns associated with the exited investments; d) performance of the target firms (from the 
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investment date up to three years after the investment); e) screening criteria employed by PE 
investors to screen out non attractive investment opportunities; these criteria are ranked on a scale 
of 1–5 in order to capture the level of relevance associated with each criterion, as perceived by PE 
investors; f) financial forms employed by PE investors, as well as the control and cash flow rights 
retained by them (including exit rights and events upon which a reallocation of cash flow and 
control right may occur).  
To evaluate the representativeness of our sample, we compared our dataset with both AIFI 
Statistics Reports and the Private Equity Monitor (PEM®) database, which includes generic and 
standard information about all PE deals realized in Italy. Table A.1 shows the various comparison 
tests we performed between the PEM data (or AIFI data) and our sample to ensure the 
representativeness of our dataset (see Table A.1 Panels B–G). In particular, Panels B-D compare 
our database with the PEM sample, while Panels E–G compare our data with the AIFI Statistics 
Reports. We performed several comparison tests with respect to various sample characteristics: 
target firm location (Panel B); industry distribution of PE transactions (Panel C, part 1) and buyouts 
(Panel C, part 2); yearly distribution of PE investments over the 1999-2006 period (Panel D); exit 
distribution of PE divestments over the 2000-2012 period (Panel E); IPO distribution over the 2000-
2012 time horizon (Panel F); and write-off distribution (Panel G). As highlighted in Table A.1 
(Panels B–G), our sample is quite similar to the datasets provided by AIFI and PEM. Apart from a 
few exceptions, no statistically significant differences exist between our dataset and the PEM 
database (Panels B–D). Similar patterns emerge when comparing our dataset with the AIFI 
Statistics Reports (Panels E–G): the comparison tests do not show statistically significant 
differences, apart from a few rare cases. For example, Panels B and C focus on the location 
distribution of target firms (Panel B) and industry distribution of PE investments realized in Italy 
(Panel C). The comparison tests show no significant differences between Private Equity Monitor 
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(PEM) data and our sample.18 Similar trends are observed in Panel E, which focuses on distribution 
of divestments realized from 2000 to 2012. In terms of exit distribution, the comparison tests in 
Panel E do not show statistically significant differences. In terms of yearly distribution of buyout 
investments (Panel D), IPO distribution (Panel F) and write-off distribution (Panel G), the 
comparison tests indicate scant statistical significance in terms of differences between our sample 
and the PEM® or AIFI data. Panel D shows that the proportion of buyouts is similar in both 
datasets, apart from the years of 2000 and 2004, for which our sample comprises a higher 
proportion of buyouts. The comparison tests in Panels F do not highlight significant differences 
except for the years of 2003 and 2004, for which AIFI Statistics report higher proportion of IPO 
exits. Similar conclusions can be driven by looking at Panel G, which compares the write-off 
distribution related to AIFI dataset with the one related to our sample. In Panel G, no relevant 
differences emerge, aside from the sole exception of the year 2007, for which our database report a 
higher percentage of write off. 
[Insert Table A.1 About Here] 
                                                
18
 It is worth noting that the PEM® data highlighted in Panels B–D cover the period 1999–2003, the years for which the 
information is available. For Panels B–D, comparison tests in our sample are reported for the 1999–2006 period. We 
also performed comparison tests with reference to the shorter period (1999–2003) and did not observe materially 
different results. 
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Table A.1. Representativeness Tests 
This Table presents comparison of proportions tests between the survey data used in this paper relative to the data reported by the PEM® database, 
published by the Italian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (AIFI) in association with the “Masters in Merchant Banking” team of 
Università Carlo Cattaneo ( LIUC). To show that the data are representative of the population, we perform various comparison tests (see Panels B- 
G). Panel A summarizes the response rate and coverage for our sample. Panel B compares the proportion of investments by location, Panel C 
compares the industry sectors for all types of PE investments and buyout transactions, Panel D compares the years of investment, Panel E compares 
the exit year distributions of investments, Panel F compares the IPO exit years, Panel G companies the write-off exit years. The *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
       
 Panel A: Response Rate 
  
PEM & AIFI STATISTICS 
REPORTS OUR SURVEY  
RESPONSE RATE & 
COVERAGE 
 
Total number of AIFI members in 
Oct. 2005, including new funds, VC 
funds and PE funds (source: AIFI 
statistics, October 2005) 88 27 31%   
 
Total number of buyout deals carried 
out within the 2000-06 period 
(source: PEM database) 284 109* 38%   
 
Total number of PE firms actively 
involved in the PE industry at the 
time of our survey (source: PEM 
Report 2005) 57 27 47%   
 
Total number of PE firms actively 
involved in the buyout industry at 
the time of our survey (source: AIFI 
statistics, 1st term 2005) 25 21 84%   
      
* with reference to the 2000-06 
period 
      
 Panel B: Location Comparison PEM SURVEY OUR SURVEY COMPARISON  
                
Location of target firms - Area of 
investment (within Italy)  
Total # of 
Transactions 
in PEM 
(1999-2003) 
Proportion ALL 
Transactions IN 
PEM (1999-2003) 
# TOTAL 
Transactions in 
Our Data (1999-
2006 2nd 
quarter) * 
Proportion 
ALL 
transactions in 
our Data 
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
North 317 0.81 173 0.78 0.79   
Center 317 0.15 173 0.17 -0.58   
South 317 0.04 173 0.05 -0.32   
  Source: PEM 1999-2003 
* From our database we excluded 5 transactions carried out 
abroad to ensure comparison with the AIFI data 
Panel C: Industry Distribution 
Comparison PEM SURVEY OUR SURVEY 
      
COMPARISON 
  
(1) All PE transactions 
Total # of 
Total 
Transactions 
in PEM (99-
2003) 
Proportion of 
transactions in PEM 
(99-2003) 
Total # 
Transactions in 
Our Data (1999-
2006 2nd 
quarter) 
Proportion of 
PE deals in 
our Data 
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
Industrial / Basic Material 317 0.45 178 0.46 -0.21   
Consumer Goods 317 0.20 178 0.16 1.02   
Services / Financial Services 317 0.24 178 0.22 0.45   
Telecommunication / Utilities 317 0.06 178 0.05 0.46   
Technology 317 0.03 178 0.06 -1.62   
Healthcare 317 0.02 178 0.05 -1.85 * 
    1.00   1.00     
  Source: PEM 1999-2003         
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Table A.1 continued 
(2) Buyouts transactions  
 
 
Total # of 
Total Buyouts 
in PEM 
(1999-2003) 
Proportion Buyouts 
PEM (99-2003) 
Total # Buyouts 
Transactions in 
Our Data (1999-
2006 2nd 
quarter) 
Proportion of 
Buyout deals 
in our Data 
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
Industrial / Basic Material 134 0.57 115 0.56 0.16   
Consumer Goods 134 0.19 115 0.16 0.62   
Services / Financial Services 134 0.15 115 0.18 -0.64   
Telecommunication / Utilities 134 0.04 115 0.03 0.43   
Technology 134 0.03 115 0.04 -0.22   
Healthcare 134 0.02 115 0.04 -0.73   
    1.00   1.00     
  Source: PEM 1999-2003         
  PEM SURVEY OUR SURVEY COMPARISON   
Panel D: Yearly Distribution 
Comparison               
Buyouts 
Total # of 
Transactions 
in PEM 
(1999-2006) ° 
Proportion Buyouts 
PEM (1999-2006) 
# TOTAL 
Transactions in 
Our Data (1999-
2006 2nd 
quarter) 
Proportion 
Buyouts our 
Data 
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
1999 56 0.45 14 0.50 -0.34   
2000 69 0.33 16 0.63 -2.18 ** 
2001 60 0.20 8 0.38 -1.12   
2002 61 0.56 26 0.62 -0.48   
2003 71 0.56 29 0.55 0.08   
2004 55 0.71 29 0.90 -1.94 * 
2005 89 0.70 42 0.67 0.38   
2006 2nd quarter °° 95 0.36 14 0.36 0.02   
° Source: PEM 1999-2003; PEM 2005 for years 2004-2005. 178       
°° Source: AIFI Statistic Report 2006, 2nd quarter (where the total number of expansion, replacement and buyout deals is 48, 13, and 34 
respectively). 
  AIFI  DATABASE OUR SURVEY COMPARISON   
Panel E: Exit Distribution 
Comparison               
EXIT DISTRIBUTION-ALL 
TRANSACTIONS (2000-2009) 
Total # of exit 
in AIFI 
database 
(1999-2012) 
Proportion of 
exits through 
trade sale in 
AIFI 
# Exits in Our 
Dataset (1999-
2012) 
Proportion of 
exits through 
trade sale in 
our Database  
Comparison of 
Proportions Test 
  
2000 188 0.58 3 0.67 -0.31   
2001 148 0.55 3 0.66 -0.38   
2002 149 0.52 3 0.33 0.65   
2003 222 0.52 10 0.50 0.12   
2004 137 0.36 11 0.45 -0.60   
2005 150 0.47 10 0.70 -1.41   
2006 181 0.38 22 0.52 -1.27   
2007 207 0.51 25 0.50 0.09   
2008 181 0.54 21 0.53 0.09   
2009° 143 0.6 19 0.47 1.05   
2010 123 0.51 3 0.66 -0.51   
2011 139 0.44 2 1.00 -1.58   
2012°° 44 0.5 18 0.33 1.22   
  Source: AIFI statistics 150       
° It is worth noting that in 2009, Aifi Annual Report excludes write off from the proportion of exits through Trade Sale.     
°° It is worth noting that the total number of Exits recorded in AIFI in 2012 refers to the first semester only. 
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Table A.1 continued     
 
Panel F: IPO distribution 
comparison AIFI  DATABASE OUR SURVEY     
               
ALL TRANSACTIONS (2000-
2012) 
Total # of exit 
in AIFI 
database (99-
2007) 
Proportion of 
exits through 
IPO in AIFI 
# Exits in Our 
Dataset (99-2012) 
Proportion of 
exits through 
IPO in our 
Database  
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
              
2000 188 0.33 3 0.33 0.00   
2001 148 0.20 3 0.00 0.86   
2002 149 0.56 3 0.25 1.07   
2003 222 0.56 10 0.10 2.86 *** 
2004 137 0.71 11 0.09 4.19 *** 
2005 150 0.11 10 0.00 1.11   
2006 181 0.13 22 0.13 0.00   
2007 207 0.08 25 0.12 -0.68   
2008 181 0.04 21 0.00 0.93   
2009° 143 0.16 19 0.05 1.24   
2010 123 0.02 3 0 0.25   
2011 139 0.06 2 0 0.36   
2012°° 44 0.02 18 0 0.65   
  Source: AIFI statistics 150       
° It is worth noting that in 2009, Aifi Annual Report excludes write off from the proportion of exits through Trade Sale. 
  
°° It is worth noting that the total number of Exits recorded in AIFI in 2012 refers to the first semester only. 
  
  AIFI  DATABASE OUR SURVEY     
Panel G: Write off Distribution               
 ALL TRANSACTIONS (2005-
2012) 
Total # of exit 
in AIFI 
database 
(2005-2009 
Proportion of 
exits through 
write off in AIFI 
# TOTAL exits in 
Our Data (2005-09) 
Proportion of 
exits through 
Write-off in 
our Database  
Comparison of 
Proportions Test   
2005 150 0.06 10 0 0.80   
2006 181 0.10 22 0.04 0.87   
2007 207 0.04 25 0.17 -2.66 *** 
2008 181 0.20 21 0.11 0.99   
2009° 143 0.39 19 0.37 0.17   
2010 123 0.11 3 0.00 0.61   
2011 139 0.20 2 0.00 0.71   
2012°° 44 0.09 18 0.00 1.32   
  Source: AIFI statistics 120       
° It is worth noting that in 2009, Aifi Annual Report excludes write off from the proportion of 
exits through Trade Sale. 
      
°° It is worth noting that the total number of Exits recorded in AIFI in 2012 refers to the first 
semester only.       
 
